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This thesis discusses the U.S. Navy's current situation
with regard to secondary items in long supply. This study
concentrated solely on the area of acquisition of secondary
items for wholesale inventory requirements. A brief history
follows of how the U.S. Navy makes its requirements
determinations and how the Navy has ended up in a long supply
position on many items. The proposed Naval Supply Systems
Command' s termination model is examined in detail
.
Recommendations are given for potential improvements in this
model which should result in more accurate determinations of
the actual costs involved in a termination decision. An
alternative decision model is proposed which, if implemented
in the Navy, will assist both item managers and buyers in
making the best business decisions on whether to terminate a





I. INTRODUCTION _________ i
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 1
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ______ ._,_. 4
C. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS -- 4
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 5
E. ORGANIZATION -- 6
II. BACKGROUND _______ _______ 3
A. A PROBLEM IN EXISTENCE FOR MANY YEARS 8
B. WHY ITEMS IN "EXCESS" OF REQUIREMENTS ARE ----- 24
ON ORDER
C. PROCUREMENT LEAD TIME (PCLT) .-____. .__ 27
D. STRATIFICATION VS. SUPPLY DEMAND REVIEW ------- 32
(SDR)
E. SUMMARY ______ _ 39
III. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION _______________ 40
A. INTRODUCTION _______________ 40
B. THE PURPOSE OF INVENTORY 40
C. THE HISTORY OF INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 41
D. NAVY INVENTORY LEVELS 43
E. INVENTORY SYSTEM IN USE 44
F. INVENTORY PROCEDURES USED -- _---- 46
G. SUMMARY - -- 53
IV. CONTRACT TERMINATION --- 54
A. INTRODUCTION 54
iv
B. TYPES OF CONTRACT TERMINATION 54
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 57
D. TERMINATION PROCEDURES 64
E. SUMMARY 66
V. COSTS TO BE CONSIDERED 67
A. INTRODUCTION 67
B. COSTS INCURRED BY CONTINUING THE CONTRACT 67
C. COSTS INCURRED BY TERMINATING THE CONTRACT 73
D. SUMMARY 85
VI. CURRENT NAVY EFFORTS 86
A. INTRODUCTION 86
B. NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND'S TERMINATION 86
MODEL
C. NAVY SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER TERMINATION 96
CRITERIA
D. NEW INVENTORY POLICY 100
E. POTENTIAL SYSTEMS 101
F. SUMMARY _______ 105
VII. DEC IS ION-MAKING MODEL 106
A. INTRODUCTION — 106
B. RESEARCHER'S MODEL 106
C. COMPARISON OF LOGIC 126
D. SUMMARY 139





D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 145
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 147
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY 148
APPENDIX B: DRAFT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION -- 152
APPENDIX C: TERMINATION PROCEDURES AND THRESHOLD 156
CRITERIA, NAVY SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER
MEGHAN I CSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA
APPENDIX D: CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DIVISION FORMS 163
NAVY SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER,
MEGHAN I CSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA
LIST OF REFERENCES -- 166




The Federal government, in order to keep its various
agencies and departments operational, is constantly ordering
material for its use. Regardless of how carefully the
requirements for these items were originally determined,
frequently there arises a need to revise requirement
quantities either upward or downward. The reason that items
are no longer required could be circumstances such as the
ending of a war, obsolescence, or items being returned from
operating units due to equipment modifications or deletions
.
Depending upon the length of time since the original
requirement was determined, the purchase request for the
items no longer needed could be somewhere in administrative
channels or already under contract. Those items which are
under contract are, by definition, said to be in "long
supply." For a long supply situation, it would be of great
use to both the buyer and the item manager (IM) if there were
a mechanism available to help them choose between continuing
the procurement action (s) and conducting some form of
termination process on the procurement action (s) .
When should the U.S. Navy terminate procurement contracts
for secondary items which are in long supply? The Department
of Defense (DOD) presently has no specific guidance on when,
or even if, such contracts should be terminated. Even the
term "long supply" has taken on several different meanings
in the past few years. If DOD has yet to issue an
instruction specifically addressing this issue, and, even
more important, if "long supply" has yet to be uniformly
defined, is an item being in "long supply" really a problem
or just a passing fancy of various auditors?
Both the General Accounting Office (GAO) [Ref. 1] and the
Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) have been
critical of the various DOD Components with regards to their
failure to terminate contracts for secondary items which the
auditors believed were in excess of the Components' current
requirements. Due to the recent period of adverse publicity
concerning spare part (secondary items) prices, the DOD
Components appear to be quite concerned about potential
adverse publicity that could result from buying "too many"
secondary items. The most recently published report on this
topic area was conducted by the GAO on the Navy and was
released January 6, 1988 [Ref. 1]. In this report, GAO had
adverse comments about the Navy's failure to comply strictly
with economic order quantities (EOQ)
.
The key problems appear to be two-fold. One problem is
that of cost control. In the current era of financial belt-
1A glossary of the various technical terms used but
perhaps not fully explained in the text of this thesis is
provided as Appendix A.
tightening that DOD is facing, if partial or complete
termination is indicated, how are the previously obligated
funds recouped? How can the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) operate
properly as a "revolving fund" if its dollars are tied up in
items in long supply or even in partially completed items
and/or raw material which comprises the termination
inventory? What should be done if it would cost nearly the
same to terminate the contract as it would to complete the
contract?
The second type of problem is one concerning the
requirement determination process. How are requirement
determinations conducted by the U.S. Navy such that items in
long supply are ordered or kept on order? What process is
used to determine which contract, if any, should be
terminated? If an item is determined to be in excess, which
stock points should maintain the item? Should the disposal
system be used to eliminate the remainder? What report
should be the basis for a termination decision? How is the
item manager (IM) evaluated concerning his/her percentage or
dollar amount of items in long supply? What incentives exist
for the IM and the contractor as far as terminations for
convenience go? How does the Productive Unit Resourcing
System (PURS) account for the effort expended in terminating
the purchase request or contract?
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary question, which was the focus for this
research is:
Should the U.S. Navy terminate secondary item contracts
considered to be in excess of current requirements?
From this basic question, five subsidiary questions were
developed:
1. How are items determined to be in excess of
requirements by Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC)
?
2. What is the decision-making process leading to a
termination for the convenience of the Government of
secondary item contracts?
3. What is the potential impact of the draft DOD
Instruction (Appendix B) regarding secondary items no
longer needed on the Navy' s wholesale inventory
operating procedures?
4. What is the requirements process and how can it lead to
the placement of contracts for items in excess of
requirements?
5. What are the principal elements of a model which
produces an optimum decision regarding contract
termination for items in excess of requirements?
C. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS
This research concentrates solely on the area of
acquisition of secondary items for wholesale inventory
requirements. The Navy's major Inventory Control Points
(ICPs), which are responsible for properly managing the
wholesale inventory, are Navy Ships Parts Control Center
2The optimum decision in this case is that which
minimizes total dollars invested in inventory while not
adversely affecting the System Material Availability (SMA)
rate
.
(SPCC) and Aviation Supply Office (ASO) . The focus of the
research is principally on SPCC, but implications could be
used at ASO for similar situations. The scope of this
research effort was limited to SPCC-managed secondary items.
Since only secondary items were to be reviewed, no contracts
for services or for research and development were included.
Procurement contracts with both large and small firms were
reviewed.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary research methodology employed was an
extensive review of relevant literature. This review was
conducted both to obtain a historical picture of how DOD got
into its present situation regarding long supply and to look
at the various techniques the different Services use to
minimize their items in long supply. Sources used included;
the Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School, the
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE)
,
Federal Legal Information Through Electronics (FLITE) , and
the Defense Systems Management College publications. Various
current professional and trade publications were helpful in
identifying the current trends and technology that might be
used at SPCC. These useful sources of information are
contained in the List of References section of this thesis.
The secondary research methodology employed was a
combination of personal and telephone interviews. In order
to develop a better personal understanding of what the
5
current situation actually was, a short fact finding trip was
taken to the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and SPCC.
This trip was enlightening in regards to problem areas not
normally discussed in written articles, as well as how
individual divisions both within SPCC and between SPCC and
NAVSUP interact. This trip formed the basis for the
recommendations and conclusions of Chapter VIII.
In-depth discussions were held with various members of
the program support office of the Weapons Systems Support
Group (SPCC 05 Staff) as well as the IMs' actual superiors.
No actual interviews were conducted with the individual IMs
.
Interviews were conducted with both procuring contracting
officers (PCOs) and termination contracting officers (TCOs)
The interviews with the PCOs were conducted in person at SPCC
while those with the TCOs were conducted via telephone with
personnel at two of the nine Defense Contract Administration
Service Regions (DCASRs)
.
The information obtained from these methods was analyzed,
compared, and contrasted in order to obtain a clearer picture
of what the various forces, effects and considerations were
relevant to the problem of deciding which secondary item
contracts should be terminated if in long supply.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II gives the background of how the problem of
items in long supply has grown to its present dollar amount
and current high level of interest
.
6
Chapter III describes the basic requirements
determination process, basic inventory theory, the
assumptions upon which the EOQ model is based, and some of
the peculiarities inherent in the Navy's Uniform Inventory
Control Program (UICP)
.
Chapter IV discusses when and how terminations for the
convenience of the Government came into being, and what
restrictions have been placed upon its use by case law.
Chapter V looks at the various costs which should be
considered in an effective cost-benefit analysis used to
determine whether to terminate a contract for the item in
long supply.
Chapter VI discusses the initiatives which were begun by
both NAVSUP and SPCC to better control both the termination
decision and the requirements procedure.
Chapter VII presents the decision model for actions to be
taken when an item, having open procurement actions, is
determined to be in excess of requirements . This chapter
also contains the justification for the selection of various
values for the parameters used in the model. A comparison is
also made between the model developed in this chapter and
SPCC's current termination procedures.
Chapter VIII is a summary of the findings and conclusions




A. A PROBLEM IN EXISTENCE FOR MANY YEARS
The need for the Armed Services to terminate a contract
for items which are in long supply is not a recent
phenomenon. Since the Civil War, this situation has normally
occurred as a war was coming to an end. After the Armed
Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) was issued in 1941,
the area of concern with regard to excess material has been
the lack of aggressive cancellations of contracts for items
in long supply. The GAO, serving as Congress ' "watchdog" on
the nation's purse f has repeatedly criticized the. Services
for their lack of aggressive cancellations.
The first such published report found during the
literature search was one concerning Air Force spare parts
procurement for the period of 1956 to 1957. This report
found: [Ref. 2:p. i]
...that large quantities of aircraft parts on order in
excess of needs were not canceled because satisfactory
controls had not been established to assure timely
cancellation action when requirements were reduced. ... only
a small portion of the excesses on contract had been
canceled prior to our review, although program changes and
other factors had caused many of these items to become
excess 7 or 8 months earlier.
What was believed to have triggered the excesses was a
major reduction in the flying hour program for fiscal year
1957. The reason excesses occurred was the management at the
activity: [Ref. 2:p. 3]
...had not established satisfactory controls to assure
that, when requirements were reduced, timely reviews would
be made of outstanding orders for supplies and that
unneeded quantities on order would be promptly canceled.
The dollar amounts involved, although small by today's
standards, were quite large for the time. GAO stated that
their review showed the activity had, "in excess of current
program needs, over $20,000,000 worth of spare parts on hand
and about $20,000,000 more on order." [Ref. 2:p. i]
GAO recommended that the following changes be made to Air
Force supply regulations for the activity: [Ref. 2:pp. 11,12]
1. Quantities on order which are excess to termination
levels be considered for termination action immediately
after requirements are computed and that excesses which
have been delivered to the Air Force be considered
promptly for return to contractors as Government-
furnished equipment for use in the production of
aircraft or engines, with appropriate adjustments in
contract prices
.
2. A report be prepared for all excess Hi-Valu (sic)
items, by property class, as soon as consideration has
been given to these items in the computation of
requirements (a) indicating the actions initiated and
(b) appropriately explaining items on which no
termination or return to contractor has been initiated,
and that this report be reviewed and evaluated by the





A register and follow-up system be maintained in each
prime property class unit in order to control the
states of Hi-Valu (sic) items for which termination or
return to the contractor has been initiated and that
each prime property class unit make a periodic report
to the Director of Supply and Services regarding its
progress in reducing quantities of excess Hi-Valu (sic)
items
.
4. The Requirements Analysis Branch review the status of
excess items and compliance with Air Force regulations
for reducing excesses.
The Air Force reported that it had implemented all the
recommendations and that a "30-day limit has been set for
terminating orders or offering delivered spare parts to
contractors after reduced requirements are computed." [Ref.
2:p. 12]
During the same basic time period as the case above, GAO
also provided statistics for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and
1956 relating to contracts terminated for the convenience of
the Government by the Armed Services. [Ref. 3] This GAO
report summarized statistics on 12,535 contracts terminated
by the Government and 12,979 settlements (either negotiated
or unilaterally determined dollar amounts awarded the
contractor in place of the original contract dollar value)
effected during fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956. The
report stated: [Ref. 3:p. 7]
During the period January 1, 1954, through April 30, 1956,
the Department of the Navy terminated, for the convenience
of the Government, 2,060 contracts having a total CPIT
(Contract Price of Items Terminated) of $1,297,745,656.
Table 2-1 on the following page summarizes the Navy's
terminations, settlements, and number of unsettled
terminations as of April 30, 1956.
Of the total contracts terminated by the Navy, as
reported in the 1957 GAO report [Ref. 3], 16.6% had Contract
Price of Items Terminated (CPITs) of $100,000 and over. This
10




Jan. 1 to Jun. 30, 1954
Jul. 1, 1954 to
Jun. 30, 1955








Total terminations 2, 060 1, 297 .7
Deduct settlements:
Jan. 1 to Jun. 30, 1954 422 278.2
Jul. 1, 1954 to
Jun. 30, 1955 773 587.8
Jul. 1, 1955 to
Apr. 30, 1956 919_ 513.7
Total settlements 2, 174 1,379.7
Revisions in CPIT from
Jan. 1, 1954, to Apr.
30, 1956, net increase
_ZZZ 52 .
Unsettled terminations,
Apr. 30, 1956 806 $1,825.0
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16.6% of the total number accounted for 93.7% of the total
dollar value of contracts terminated. Of interest, 83.7% of
the number and 42.6% of the dollar value were in fixed-price
contracts. These figures would be much lower today. 14% of
the number and 7.9% of the dollar value were in CPFF (cost
plus fixed fee) contracts, which are no longer used. 2.2% of
the number and 49.5% of the dollar value were in letter
contracts. The letter contract dollar value percentage has
decreased considerably in recent years. [Ref. 3:p.9]
During the 1954 to 1956 period, the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation (ASPR) allowed the contractor a period
of two years in which to submit his settlement proposal for
contracts terminated by the Government. This period could be
extended from time to time with the approval of the
contracting officer. As is true today, the two years in some
cases was just a starting point due to delays resulting from
disputes or claims being considered by the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeal (ASBCA) or the courts . This is
vividly demonstrated in GAO' s report when "at December 31,
1956, 56 of these terminations, with a CPIT of $719,585,343,
still remained unsettled and at that date had been in process
of settlement for periods ranging from 33 to 63 months."
[Ref. 3:p. 10]
In the next ten years, the GAO issued six separate
reports "disclosing unnecessary costs incurred with (sic) the
DOD because excess procurements were not canceled or
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reduced." [Ref. 4: pp. 32,33] The basic problem that GAO
reported was that in none of the cases they reviewed was
there any comparison done of the costs to hold versus the
cost to cancel
.
In the specific case of excess missile spare parts, GAO
reported that $154,000 in costs were incurred due to the IM
failing to cancel purchase requests prior to contract award
when the request was known to exceed the requirements
objective. [Ref. 4:p. 5]
After the Army complained that the GAO had not carefully
reviewed all the applicable regulations, and specifically an
internal memorandum of September 4, 1964, entitled
"Cancellation of Procurement Requests," GAO stated: [Ref.
4:p. 15]
In our opinion, however, the procedures contained in the
September 1964 memorandum were deficient in that (1) they
provided that the contracting officer, rather than the
supply commodity manager, was responsible for deciding
whether termination of excessive procurement was more
economical than accepting delivery of excess parts and (2)
they contained no provision for furnishing the contracting
officer with the necessary information pertaining to the
costs of holding excessive stock on hand.
In this case also, the Army first states what has been
heard numerous times since then: [Ref. 4:p. 29]
Initial procurements were based on anticipated consumption
rates (engineering estimates) . Subsequent to these buys,
there were reductions in the major item densities, stockage
allowances, and/or estimated maintenance rates, which in
turn caused items to become excess to procurement levels
but not necessarily excess to authorized stockage levels
(the procurement level is just one of approximately ten
separate segments which comprise the funded requirements .
These funded requirements when combined with certain
unfunded requirements constitute the authorized stockage
13
level of an item.) . Various attempts were made toward
cancellation of the requirement; however, the bulk of the
requirements were under contract and not terminated because
of high cancellation costs and the expectation that
material would be required at a later date.
The next eight years or so were relatively quiet as far
as GAO reports concerning the Armed Services and inventory
problems. On September 12, 1972, GAO published "Need to
Improve Accuracy of Air Force Requirements System for
Repairable Parts." In that report, GAO stated that the




Data not being checked for accuracy before being used
due to manager's heavy workload.
2. Good information sources not being readily available
for some of the needed data.
3. Policies and procedures being ambiguous and unclear.




The next ten years yielded 15 more GAO reports on
inventory-related issues [Ref. 6:p. 27]. In November 1981,
GAO made a review to check the validity of the various
Services' requirements determination processes. They also
looked at the various techniques in use to see if "cross
pollination" would help the different branches better use
their finite resources.
Unfortunately, GAO found little consistency and
coordination between the services on methods to determine
requirements. The problem areas GAO had reported on in 1972
were still present in 1981. Additionally, GAO found fault
14
with: the lack of uniformity in what the various lead times
encompassed, and how they were determined; how inaccuracies
in the system appeared to be the rule; and the reasons each
Service insisted on using a different forecasting technique.
[Ref. 5:pp. ii-v]
One of the recommendations that the GAO mentioned was for
DOD to: [Ref. 5:p. v]
- Issue guidance to the services which specifically states
(1) when a production lead time should be terminated
,
and
(2) how lead time requirements should be determined for
items requiring first article testing.
Based upon this recommendation and a June 1983 GAO
report, DOD authorized a study to be conducted by the
Logistics Systems Analysis Office with the objectives of
reviewing current practices both of DOD and selected
contractors and then developing standard criteria for the
"determination of realistic procurement lead times for
secondary items." [Ref. 7:p. 2]
The Logistics Systems Analysis Office completed their
study and reported their findings in March 1984 [Ref. 7] .
The results of their study were incorporated into DOD
Instruction 4140.55, "Procurement Lead Times for Secondary
-3
The researcher believes that what GAO meant by this
statement was that when contracts were awarded with a
delivery schedule which encompassed a long period of time,
uniformity between the Services was needed. One Service
would include the time from contract award until the last
unit was delivered while another Service would only include
the time from contract award to the first unit being
delivered, thus resulting in a major difference being
reported in the length of time involved.
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Items" dated December 9, 1985 [Ref . 8] . This area will be
discussed in further detail in the procurement lead time
(PCLT) section of this chapter.
In 1982, the GAO reiterated their opinion stated in 1974
that "many aircraft operational readiness problems were
caused by unexpected parts failures, late repairs of parts,
and modification or updating of parts, rather than a lack of
sufficient funds." [Ref. 6:p. 1] In the report once again
lead time delays, in this case production lead time delays,
were mentioned as a cause of item criticality. The Air Force
item managers attempted to compensate for this delay by not
cancelling contracts which presently were in long supply but
potentially could be used in the future.
An October 15, 1982 GAO report [Ref. 9] identified an
additional manner in which items came into long supply. This
report pointed out failure of communications as the cause for
items becoming long supply. One such failure of
communications was found within the Air Force system.
Another was a failure by the Air Force to notify DLA of
planned modifications and changes to material requirements.
As the report stated: [Ref. 9:p. i]
When Defense-managed items are being removed or replaced
(during planned modifications and/or equipment changes), it
is important for managers (DLA item managers) to be alerted
so that proper decisions can be made to purchase and repair
only those items needed through the completion of the
modification program.
This failure of communications was further demonstrated
in GAO' s January 10, 1984 report on DLA inventories [Ref.
16
10] . In this report, GAO found that DLA IMs did not
adequately consider other Services' procurement actions prior
to ordering for the first time. Additionally, GAO stated
that the criteria used by DLA IMs to determine whether to
terminate or not allowed for excessive buffer stocks. [Ref.
10 :p. 1] This report was the first in which GAO mentioned
some of the legitimate reasons for a Service to purposely
over-order an item. These included:
1. valid known requirements were excluded from the
requirements computation,
2. different criteria existed for asset application in
stratification decisions and supply control decisions,
resulting in different supply positions, and
3. the items were obtainable only from Diminishing
Manufacturing Sources (DMSMS)
.
In GAO's sample of 100 items, 45 items totaling $1.4
million were erroneously reported as overprocured for the
above three reasons. The remaining 55 items totalling $2.1
million became excessive for the following reasons: [Ref.
1 : pp . 7,8]
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of items % of dollars
Demand decreased after buy 45.4 67.7
IM overbought on purpose and/or
in error 27.3 21.7
Logistics reassignment problem 12.7 5.5
Reduced procurement cycle due
to standard price increase 9.1 2.3
Other 5^5 2.8
Total 100 100
The DOD response to this GAO review stated that there
were instances in which the administrative and possible
termination costs associated with cancelling contractual
quantities could result in an inappropriate action being
taken. These occurred when: [Ref. 10:p. 16]
1. There is high probability that potential overprocured
quantities will be utilized during a future period;
2. The availability of such quantities will negate the
need for procurement funds during a future period; and
3. Cancellation of contractual quantities would cajise a
repetitive purchase action in the ensuing months.
The next report that came out concerning inventory
management, shortly after the spares pricing "horror stories"
4The researcher believes the proper term that should be
used here is reorder cycle. As the cost of an item
increases, the EOQ model recommends a reduced quantity to buy
but at a more frequent rate.
5As will be discussed in Chapter VI, a major concern in
deciding whether to terminate is the expected "churn." Churn
in this case refers to the situation in which an item is
recommended for termination on one SDR, is terminated, then
shortly thereafter is recommended for a buy.
made the front pages, was a DOD Inspector General (DODIG)
report on the "Defense-Wide Audit of Procurement of Spare
Parts." [Ref. 11] The DODIG found fault with the buyers for
failing to purchase spares directly from the actual
manufacturer regardless of the lack of sufficient personnel
to perform the breakouts required. [Ref. 11 :p. 6]
One of the actions that DOD took to increase competition
and facilitate breakouts was to revise personnel evaluation
factors to look not only at the quantity of purchase actions
completed but also to look at the achievement of economical
purchases. [Ref. ll:p. 7]
Purchasing of uneconomical quantities was another problem
area identified. Specifically: [Ref. 11 :p. 9]
1. the procuring activity did not take advantage of price
breaks offered by vendors for larger buys of needed
items,
2. usage of the item justified less frequent and higher
quantity buys than those made (normally mature items
with a relatively stable demand history)
,
3. emphasis was placed on ordering minimum quantities of
initial spares although the items' designs were stable
and larger purchases could be justified, or
4. more than one stock number was listed for the same
part, or a preferred substitute item was available in
the Federal Supply System. Combining the requirement
for both stock numbers or buying the substitute item
would have resulted in lower unit prices
.
Breakout is the term used to describe the process by
which parts identified on drawings are traced back to their
original manufacturer. By buying the part from the original
manufacturer, dollars are saved due to removing layers of
companies which do not change the item but add their costs
and profits onto the item before selling it to the government.
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During the same time frame that DODIG was auditing the
Services, GAO was reviewing the Navy's procedures and
practices for cancelling procurements of unneeded material
[Ref . 12] . Problems that GAO identified included ICPs
establishing high dollar review thresholds, providing added
buffer stocks, failing to act on termination notices in a
timely manner, and establishing only limited supervision
throughout the cancellation process. [Ref. 12 :p. 1]
In the year of the study, fiscal year 1983, SPCC's UICP
initiated 24,429 termination notices valued at about $800
million [Ref. 12 :p. 3]. The individual IM, upon receipt of a
termination notice, has three choices concerning the
recommended termination quantity; (1) approve the quantity,
(2) reduce the quantity, or (3) reject the quantity entirely.
GAO found that the cancellation rate was quite low; less
than 2% of the dollar value was approved by the IMs for
possible cancellation, and less than 1% was actually canceled
[Ref. 12:p. 3]. GAO' s final estimate was that approximately
8% of the dollar value could have been canceled [Ref. 12 :p.
4] .
GAO' s problem with the review thresholds was that they
were not based on an assessment of costs and benefits.
Specifically, GAO did not like SPCC "subjectively" setting
the review thresholds ( the dollar value of the excess
material at which the corresponding procurement actions would
be reviewed for potential cancellation) in effect May 1983 at
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$2,500 for purchase requests, $10,000 for purchase requests
under solicitation, and $25,000 for contracts. In November
1983 these amounts were increased to $10,000 for purchase
requests and $50,000 for contracts, again with no
cost/benefit analysis being conducted [Ref. 12 :p. 4]. GAO'
s
reasoning was that the dollar limitations "greatly affect the
value of excess material that can be considered for
cancellation." [Ref. 12 :p. 4] These review thresholds will
be discussed in Chapters VI and VII of this thesis.
Of interest is a statement in the GAO report that
"(n)otices not rejected within the 5 days are automatically
approved by the Uniform Inventory Control Point (UICP) system
and forwarded to the purchasing division for possible
cancellation." [Ref. 12 :p. 6] As each GAO report normally
contains a section in which the audited agency is permitted
an opportunity to respond, the researcher was surprised when
no response to this statement was included in DOD's comments.
The reason for this surprise was the researcher'
understanding concerning the operation of the UICP system.
This understanding was that while the UICP might
automatically produce purchase orders for required items,
UICP required human intervention to cancel requirements due
to the potential losses involved in both time and dollars.
This discrepancy, plus the importance of knowing whether UICP
did indeed automatically send cancellations to the purchasing
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division, presented an item to be resolved during the
researcher's thesis travel to SPCC.
During the researcher's thesis travel to SPCC, the
question as to how the UICP treated cancellations was brought
up several different times. When this question was asked of
personnel in the Weapon Systems Support Group (the IMs'
bosses) , they provided a copy of their instruction titled
"Consumable and Depot Level Repairable (DLR) Supply Demand
Review (SDR)" [Ref. 13]. This instruction clearly states,
"Termination . SDR recommended terminations are normally
7Mead, ' meaning they must be prepared as adds for the
termination to be effective." [Ref. 13 :p. 5] The personnel
contacted in SPCC s contracting department did not agree with
this. The actual contract administrators contacted stated
that there were "numerous" instances in which after receiving
a termination request, they contacted the appropriate IM to
see if indeed a cancellation was required, and the IM stated
that this was "the first they had heard of it." This is a
current problem which exists at SPCC and most definitely must
be resolved in order to achieve the high degree of mutual
trust required of all parties in order to rectify the current
long supply problem.
The Air Force was the next service to have the GAO review
its procedures and practices for terminating procurements of
7
"Adds" in this case refers to the addition of the item
to the SDR action form.
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excess on-order spare parts [Ref . 14] . As the Air Force uses
a quarterly computational system (D041), relatively few
reviews are done (compared to the Navy's SDR) to determine if
reorder points have been reached in a timely fashion, and
thus a higher average inventory level is required (the
periodic review procedure is discussed in Chapter III) . In
the Air Force, the IMs review the D041 recommendations and
validate its data with facts that they know. Based upon this
adjustment and consideration of various costs and factors
such as the amount of production lead time (PLT) which has
elapsed, the IMs recommend the quantity to be terminated.
The IMs' recommendations are then reviewed by their
supervisor. Both the IMs' and the supervisor's
recommendations are then forwarded to the contracting and
manufacturing directorate. Only at this directorate is the
final decision on termination made. If this sounds very time
intensive, it is. While the Air Force Logistics Command
(AFLC) Regulations require that IMs review termination
recommendations within 10 work days after receipt, in
practice it takes much longer. GAO stated: [Ref. 14 :p. 9]
Of the 19 items at Sacramento, 12 were not reviewed
within the required 10 work days. Six of the 12 had
been in the material management directorate' s review
process for more than 60 days, including one item which
was under management review for 98 days and another
which had been held for 89 days with no action.
A possible reason for the delays in review could be the
amount of data errors in the D041 system. The AFLC directed
its Air Logistic Centers to validate reported on-order item
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excesses that exceeded $1 million from the cycle run March
31, 1986. The review reported that the initial $1,405.9
million value of reported on-order excesses was in fact
overstated by $730.2 million, or 51.9%. [Ref. 14:p. 11]
In January 1988, it was the Navy's turn once again to
have GAO review its requirements determination process to
ensure it was accurately determining what was needed [Ref.
1] . Based upon its review, GAO felt: [Ref. l:p.2]
The Navy could reduce the potential for increasing its
stocks beyond current needs (long supply) and minimize
the costs of ordering and holding inventory by
ordering the economic order quantity (EOQ) rather than
a 1-year supply.
This GAO report and one other GAO report on DOD inventory
management [Ref. 15] were the catalysts for this thesis. GAO
reported that for all of DOD, secondary items identified as
"excess" had grown almost 200 percent between fiscal years
1981 and 1987. [Ref. 15 :p. 9] "In dollar figures, these
excesses are valued at $29.5 billion, up from $10.2 billion
in 1981." [Ref. 15 :p. 9] With figures such as those above,
it was logical to research the potential methodology for
identifying items truly in long supply and how a reduction of
items in long supply might be achieved while simultaneously
not adversely affecting major weapon system availablilty
.
B. WHY ITEMS IN "EXCESS" OF REQUIREMENTS ARE ON ORDER
Researching various reasons the Services would purposely
order or keep on order items in "excess" of known
requirements was quite revealing. From the various GAO and
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other similar reports discussed in the previous section, the
following reasons were mentioned:
1. Support for aging military equipment. When the
original equipment manufacturer notifies the user of
his intention to stop producing spare parts due to
either age or technological advances, the user is
forced to decide whether to conduct a Life-of-Type
(LOT) buy of the remaining stock, attempt
commercialization, or find another source. If, under
the Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material
Shortage (DMSMS) program [Ref. 16], the LOT buy is the
chosen route, then items in excess of immediate needs
will definitely be ordered. But this type of
procurement is a legitimate ordering technique. [Ref.
17:pp. 24-29]




c. flying hour decreases, and
d. weapon system deployment changes.
3
.
Modifications to correct deficiencies or to improve
capabilities of existing weapons systems and equipment.
The problem that arises here is when the engineers plan
and execute a modification without informing the
appropriate IMs . The IMs continue to order either the
old parts or quantities, thus resulting in "excess"
spare parts being on order. [Ref. 9:p. 1]
4. COG/responsibility migration. When the originating
Service has passed an item to DLA for management and
has either failed to keep or to pass the proper records
of what they have on contract or under outstanding
purchase requests for prior to transfer, problems
arise. When DLA looks at the on-hand quantity, they
then order what they believe is required. Only when
both orders come in is it realized that duplication
occurred due to a communications breakdown. [Ref. 9:p.
23]
5. Increases in procurement lead time (PCLT) . As either
production lead time (PLT) or administrative lead time
(ALT) or both increase, a longer time passes between
hitting the reorder level and receipt of the item. As
25
many items display a wide variance in demand, this
increased time period creates a potential vulnerability
for the IM. Up until the past year, IMs were evaluated
primarily on the availability of stock on hand. The
natural tendency in a time of increasing PCLT was to
order enough stock to carry one through whatever the
length of added PCLT. Obviously this reaction resulted
in excessive quantities of stock either on hand or on
order. In the past year IMs have begun to have
included in their evaluation how they handled
termination recommendations . This new element in their
evaluation should force IMs to balance having "too
much" stock on hand with not accepting enough
termination recommendations
.
6. Different criteria are used between asset application
in stratification and supply demand review (SDR) . This
difference can lead to different recommendations being
made at the same time.
7
.
Reduced reorder cycle due to standard price increases
which result in smaller, but more frequent orders.
[Ref. 10:p. 7]
8. Material turned into stores (MTIS) . This occurs when
an operating unit or command realizes that they have
material which they no longer need in the quantity they
currently have on hand. Since this material is in
ready-for-issue (RFI) condition, the items are turned
into the nearest supply facility. Only when these
items are reported as being received by the
transactions reporting activity does the IM know of
their existence.
From the above eight examples, it can be seen that semi-
legitimate reasons do in fact exist for having items in
"excess" of known requirements either remain on order or be
ordered. Communications breakdown appears to be a major
contributor to several of the above categories. A major
factor appears to be the extremely lengthy PCLT and budgetary
processes. PCLT will be discussed next while budgetary
issues will be discussed in Chapter V.
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C. PROCUREMENT LEAD TIME (PCLT)
As was discussed in example five of the above section,
increases in procurement lead time (PCLT) have resulted in
items being ordered which end up becoming long supply. As
PCLT has increased, IMs have used UICPs' forecasting models
(which use historical data that has been expotentially
smoothed) and/or their own professional knowledge in an
attempt to estimate what quantity of an item to haveon-hand
at what time in order to fulfill anticipated requirements.
Unfortunately, the IMs have not been correct 100% of the
time, and thus some items which they ordered have indeed
become long supply. This section on PCLT discusses why PCLT
has attracted GAO' s interest, how PCLT is defined, and what
the effects of having incorrect values for PCLT in the UICP
does to item availability.
DOD is faced with increasing GAO interest and
dissatisfaction with the present trend of increasing PCLT. A
major reason for GAO' s interest is the dollar value which is
involved. Overall, DOD material requirements needed to
support demand during PCLT have grown from less than $8
billion in FY79, to an amount in excess of $15 billion in
FY83, to more than $20 billion in FY86. In FY83, it was
estimated that each day of lead time added $30 million to the
budget. As of FY86 this figure had grown to $40 million per
day. [Refs. 7:p. 1; 15 :p. 9; 18 :p. 1-2]
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Procurement Lead Time (PCLT) is the sum of Administrative
Lead Time (ALT) and Production Lead Time (PLT) . If either
one or both of the components increase, PCLT will increase as
well. Besides the $40-million-per-day increase effect, other
negative effects of increased PCLT are: [Ref. 18 :p. 1-2]
1. Increased safety levels and larger on-hand inventories,
2. Higher obligational authority to cover inflated
procurement pipelines,
3. Longer forecast period and less accurate projection of
material requirements,
4. Reduced system flexibility to react to technological,
operational, and other demand changes, and
5. Increased likelihood of material shortages or excesses.
An issue GAO raised in a 1981 report [Ref. 5] was the
lack of consistency between Services on when exactly ALT and
PLT started and ended. Each of the Services was reporting it
differently and in what they believed was the correct
fashion. GAO's 1981 report, and another GAO report in 1983,
prompted DOD to commission a study by the Logistics Systems
Analysis Office (LSAO) to determine what secondary item PCLT
should actually consist of. LSAO' s March 1984 study findings
[Ref. 7] provided the basis from which DOD Instruction
4140.55 of December 9, 1985 titled "Procurement Lead Times
for Secondary Items" [Ref. 8] was derived.
In order to more uniformly define ALT and PLT, the
following was done. In DOD Instruction 4140.24, ALT was
referred to as "the time interval between initiation of
procurement action and award of contract, " PLT was defined as
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"the time interval between the placement of a contract and
the first significant receipt into the supply system of
material purchased as a result of such action." [Ref. 19:
Encl . 1 p. 2] These definitions were too ambiguous so DOD
Instruction 4140.55 [Ref. 8] restated the definitions more
precisely. ALT began when: [Ref. 8:p. 2]
...an item's wholesale asset level drops to or below
the reorder point, or the time at which a procurement
order must be initiated so that stock arrives,
theoretically, just as the on-hand asset level reaches
the safety level.
ALT was to stop upon "the date the contractual instrument is
executed." [Ref. 8:p. 2] Included in ALT were the time
periods required for the "identification of the requirement
to buy; review, approval and documentation of the purchase
request; technical data review and documentation; and the
processing and execution of the contractual instrument."
[Ref. 8:p. 2]
PLT was to begin upon "the date the contractual
instrument is executed, " and to end "when receipt of delivery
is confirmed by the storage activity to the managing
Inventory Control Point (ICP)." [Ref. 8:p. 2] The exact
definition of receipt of delivery encompasses one and one-
half pages of the instruction as well as an additional page
illustrating how it should be computed.
Focusing on ALT at SPCC, there has been a large increase
in average ALT. In 1979 ALT was 110 days, of which 59 days
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queue [Ref. 20:p. 13]. The following chart shows
competitively procured items' ALT by the type of buying
methodology used. The days figure is the period from the IMs
initial purchase action until contract award, as of September
30, 1987. The percentage figures for both consumables and
repairables illustrates how the procurement dollars were
split between large and small buys. The number of buys which
used the BOA method were not available and therefore there is





Basic Ordering Agreements (BOA) displayed the smallest ALT,
small purchases (less than $25,000) were next, and large
purchases (greater than or equal to $25,000) demonstrated the
largest ALT value. In both consumable and repairable cases,
if competitive procurement was not used, between 14 and 24
percent of the ALT was eliminated [Ref. 21]
.
The Logistics Management Institute (LMI) reported in
their September 1986 study [Ref. 18] that the: [Ref. 18: p.
1-3]
...lengthening of administrative leadtime (ALT), ...,
has been a direct result of DOD efforts to improve
spare parts management. The Competition In Contracting
Act (CICA)
,
price review and analysis, breakout, and
other related initiatives, have clearly increased
wholesale administrative leadtimes and resultant
inventory levels.
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Although the fact that ALT has grown enormously since
1979 is readily acknowledged, the effects of an increased ALT
on item availability are not as readily deciphered. In
SPCC's UICP, ALT is obtained by subtracting forecasted PLT
from forecasted PCLT. The UICP never computes the actual ALT
for a procurement action. The LMI report showed that in a
comparison of file ALT to actual ALT, SPCC's mean file value
was 144 days while its mean actual value was 210 days,
thereby resulting in the file data being understated by
approximately 32%. The net result of this understated file
ALT is that the spare parts buying process of SDR is
triggered too late. By buying too late, the buyers cannot
comply with the required delivery date (RDD) from the IM.
This can lead to buyers ignoring the RDD or having to spend
additional time attempting to expedite the delivery of that
item. [Ref. 18:pp. 3-2, 4-4]
In the case of PLT at SPCC, as in ALT, an understatement
problem exists. In the LMI report, mean file PLT was 518
days while mean actual PLT was 633 days. In this case the
understatement was only 18%, but this still constituted a
115-day difference. After looking at individual items, the
cause of the majority of SPCC's understatement was that in
12.3 percent of the items reviewed, the actual PLT exceeded
twice the file PLT for the items in question. Of course the
other extreme occurred as well, items being delivered much
earlier than their due dates. Eight-and-a-half percent were
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received in 0-50% of file PLT with an additional 34.9 percent
being received in 51-90% of file PLT. [Ref. 18:pp. 3-5, 3-7]
One problem specifically noted in the LMI report was that
the contracting RDD was typically oriented toward "ensuring
that all potential suppliers can reasonably compete for the
spare parts buy." [Ref. 18 :p. 4-7] Since the RDD is set to
permit maximum competition, there is no incentive for the
vendors to bid for delivery any earlier than this date and
risk termination for default should anything go wrong. The
situation today with regards to PLT can best be summed up as
LMI stated: [Ref. 18 :p. 4-7]
The result is that the DOD requirements process is
often based on one assumed RDD and the DOD procurement
process is based on a different RDD.
Is the Navy doomed to ever-expanding PCLT? In Chapter VI
this question will be examined in regards to both the ALT
reduction program and the QSTAR revised procurement program.
D. STRATIFICATION VS. SUPPLY DEMAND REVIEW (SDR)
One must first understand the differences between
Stratification and SDR in both purposes and time frames in
order to understand how in one case an item might be believed
to be in long supply, yet a recommendation to procure
additional units might occur as a result of looking at the
same data from another viewpoint.
Stratification is a UICP program which is required to be
run semiannually as of March 31/September 30 by DOD
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Instruction 4140.24 [Ref. 19]. That Instruction prescribes:
[Ref. 19: pp. 1,2]
...a uniform sequence of requirements priority and
asset application for stratification of secondary
items.... The stratification process provides for the
accumulation, extraction and display of basic supply
data in a manner that relates assets to requirements in
a specific priority/time sequence.
This DOD Instruction was implemented within the Navy by OPNAV
Instruction 4440. 16B [Ref. 22].
In more specific phrasing, Stratification can be seen as
serving three purposes:
1. The means of computing various requirements levels and
arranging them in order of priority (DOD-prescribed
priority)
.
2. The basic tool ICPs use to establish their budget
requests
.
3. A way to identify items for potential disposal, i.e.
those with assets in excess of the retention position.
Stratification runs as a steady-state model with no
random demand (therefore an emulation rather than a
simulation) over an eight- (September 30 Stratification) or
ten- (March 31 Stratification) quarter time frame. The
assumptions that stratification is based upon are: [Ref. 23]
1. Requirements and assets are reviewed continuously and
are known at any point in time.
2. Demands occur evenly at the forecasted rate.
3. There is never more than one order outstanding at a
time
.
4. Orders are placed when the inventory position reaches
the reorder point.
5. Calculations of order quantities and reorder points are
made independently of one another.
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6. The optimal policy is the minimization of TVC (Total
Variable Costs)
.
7. The forecasted mean and variance of all random
variables used in the model are constant over time.
8. The number of units demanded per requisition is not
random, but equal to one.
Stratification contains four separate time frames:
1. Opening position - inventory status as of date
Stratification is performed.
2. Current year - only for March Stratification, covers
remainder of fiscal year after the Stratification
processing date.
3. Apportionment year - 12 months following current year.
4. Budget year - 12 months from the end of the
Apportionment year to the following September 30.
A graphic presentation of these time frames is shown in
Figure 2-1.
Stratification, when run, computes all requirements
through the budget year. It then applies the opening
position assets to these requirements and calculates any
deficiencies or excesses that occur. One of the outputs of
Stratification is called "Table I, Budget Stratification."
It is this table which the ICPs use as their primary tool for
determining their budget request. "Table II, Readiness
Retention Stratification, " is how items potentially in long
supply are identified. [Ref. 24:pp. 5-1-46, 5-1-49]
The purpose of Supply Demand Review (SDR) is to: [Ref.
25:p. 1-8]
...compute and compare system assets and system
requirements. Based on this review, there will either
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OP (Opening Position) - Snapshot of day Stratification run
CY (Current Year) - Quarters remaining in Current fiscal year
AY (Apportionment Year) - Next fiscal year; 1 OCT- 30 SEP
BY (Budget Year) - Fiscal year after next fiscal year
Figure 2-1. Stratification Time Line
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be an excess or a deficiency of system stock for a
particular item. In addition, an individual stock point
may be deficient of an item.
As will be discussed in Chapter III, transactions reporting
procedures assume that a continuous review is done. If there
were no constraints, SDR would be run daily. Unfortunately
there are constraints on both computer and personnel work
loads. NAVSUP Instruction 4440. 166A [Ref. 26] established
the policy governing the frequency of SDRs at the ICPs. This
policy is: [Ref. 26:p. 1]
The ICPs shall have the goal of performing SDR at least
once weekly for all centrally-managed secondary items
.
Tolerance limits for the elapsed time between SDR runs
are: for consumables, two weeks except when Quarterly
Levels Setting or Stratification scrubs are being done;
for repairables, six weeks.
SPCC currently is meeting the tolerance requirements for
conducting SDRs. An example of the time sequence of events
for a single SDR is as follows: [Ref. 27]
10 March Thursday SDR Run (normally completed over the
weekend)
.
14 March AM Monday SDR delivered to a clerk in SPCC 05,
who breaks the SDR down by
department
.
14 March PM Monday IMs receive their SDR outputs.
23 March PM Wednesday Deadline for IMs to "work" SDR.
They normally hand in their inputs
as completed. High dollar value
and high impact items are done
first
.
24 March Thursday The IMs inputs are delivered to the
keypunch section. Here the IM f s input
is entered into the tape for the UICP
to use. This is same date new SDR is
run, waits for inputs from old SDR.
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25-27 March Fri-Sun UICP runs, outputting both Purchase
Orders and Due-in Termination cards.
28 March Monday The purchase orders output from the UICP
are delivered by data processing to SPCC
054 for "foldering". As an ALT reduction
initiative for FY88, SPCC code 05' s goal
is to take less than -20 days to process
these folders and deliver them to SPCC
s
contracting department.
Once each quarter this two-week turnaround is slipped to
three weeks to allow for levels settings. Levels setting
results in updated cyclic data sheets for the IMs to examine.
These cyclic data sheets contain forecasts for such random
variables as demand and procurement lead time, and the
reorder point and reorder quantity which UICP will use for
the next three months for the item.
SDR compares assets to inventory requirements. The







If requirements are greater than assets, SDR will recommend:
[Ref. 25:p. 1-8]
1. Expediting outstanding contracts
2. Recalling outstanding disposal actions
3. Issuing procurement orders
o
If assets are greater than requirements, SDR will recommend :
The SDR recommendation is dollar limit constrained






The similarities between Stratification and SDR include:
[Ref. 23]
1. They both use the same data base:
MDF (Master Data File)
DDF (Due-in/Due-out File)
PPR (Planned Program Requirements File)
2. They both compute Order Quantity (Q) and Reorder Level
(R) using the same basic UICP formula.
3. They recommend the review of long supply items (but not
necessarily the same items or quantities. This is
discussed in greater depth in Chapter V)
.
The differences between Stratification and SDR include:
[Ref. 23]
1. Purpose:
Stratification - primarily the basis for budget
requirements
„
SDR - executes the budget (what to buy, when to buy,




Stratification - 24 to 30 months
SDR - procurement lead time (PCLT)
3. Levels:
Stratification - calculates its own levels and runs
as a steady-state model with no random demand.
SDR - quarterly levels computations which are based





Stratification - semi-annual for budget purposes
SDR - weekly per NAVSUP Instruction 4440. 166A [Ref.
26], however SPCC conducts them normally on a bi-
weekly basis.
5. Results:
Stratification - does not trigger a firm buy, DDF is
unchanged.
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SDR - triggers a buy. The DDF is changed either as
soon as the IM concurs, or automatically if the buy
is a low dollar amount
.
This section has provided a brief look at Stratification
and SDR. It is important to understand how Stratification
and SDR differ in order to understand how one might recommend
cancellation while the other will recommend procuring more of
the item. This disparity can result in items being
considered to be in long supply when by the other systems
description, the item is in short supply for the time period
that it considers. In Chapter VI, the basics described here
will be placed in perspective with the current problems
facing the Navy and specifically SPCC.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has described how the problem of items in
long supply has received increasing emphasis in recent years.
How items come to be in long supply was also discussed. The
effects or potential effects of increasing PCLT were
discussed. The basic similarities and differences between
Stratification and SDR were listed. The next chapter lays
the groundwork for how items are identified by the
requirements determination process as needing to be ordered.
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Ill . REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION
A. INTRODUCTION
As was discussed in Chapter II, there are numerous ways
that secondary items might end up being in long supply. This
Chapter will discuss how the decision is originally made as
to when and how many of each item should be ordered.
B. THE PURPOSE OF INVENTORY
Prichard and Eagle, in their book entitled Modern
Inventory Management , list six reasons for having
inventories. These are: [Ref. 28 :p. 1-2]
1. to save time by avoiding a prohibitively large
procurement work load,
2. to balance incoming materials against production
schedules or sales,
3. to keep a production line operating continuously,
4
.
to keep sufficient stocks to meet sales demands with a
minimum of sales losses due to stockouts,
5. to uncouple the supplier and customer. The inventory
acts as a buffer between a supplier who generally
supplies materials in large amounts at a steady rate
and a user who generally buys the output or uses the
material in smaller or more variable quantities, or
6. to receive discounts since the price of goods is a
prime consideration in establishing an inventory.
Lower prices are sometimes available when procuring
larger quantities of an item.
The Navy maintains inventories for two different
categories of items : non-demand based items and demand based
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items. Non-demand based inventories are further divided into
two separate categories, insurance items and Numeric Stockage
Objective (NSO) items. An insurance item is: [Ref. 24 :p. 1-
5]
...an essential item that will not fail in normal usage,
but if it does fail or a loss occurs, the lack of a
replacement would seriously hamper the operation of a
weapon system.
NSO items are: [Ref. 24 :p. 1-5]
...items with a predicted usage too low to qualify as a
demand based item, but the lack of a replacement item would
seriously hamper the operation of a weapon system.
Demand based inventories in the U.S. Navy exist for four
main reasons. They: (1) serve a decoupling function, (2)
allow for transportation time, (3) permit buffer or safety
stock inventories, or (4) are review cycle inventories [Ref.
24:pp. 1-5,1-6]
.
C. THE HISTORY OF INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
The existence of inventories of goods is reported in the
Old Testament of the Bible. In the past, inventories, even
those which were greatly in excess of known requirements or
storage capacity, were considered to be indications of
wealth. "An individual's wealth was usually assessed by the
size of his flocks, herds, granaries, warehouses, etc.."
[Ref. 29:p. 3]
In today's modern industrial economy, the increased
emphasis on liquidity has led businessmen to hold cash or
securities in lieu of larger inventories. This point was
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driven home during the "inventory depression" of 1921 when
" (i) nventories which had made men rich in the preceding
period bankrupted them now. Forced sales, cut prices,
liquidations, were rife." [Ref. 29:p. 6]
It was during this time frame that Ford Harris of the
Westinghouse Corporation in 1915, and others came up with the
"simple lot size formula." This formula, upon which the
current Navy inventory control programs are based, is often
referred to as "the Wilson formula, since it was also derived
by R.H. Wilson as an integral part of the inventory control
scheme which he sold to many organizations." [Ref. 30 :p. 3]
With the advent of operations research after World War
II, detailed attention was given to the stochastic nature of
inventory problems. It is notable that engineers rather than
economists were the first to use analytical techniques in
attempts to solve actual inventory problems. As Hadley and
Whitin stated: [Ref. 30:p. 3]
It is interesting to observe that economists were not the
first to take an active interest in inventory problems even
though inventories play a crucial role in the study of
dynamic economic behavior. The reason for this lack of
interest probably lies in the fact that economists were
concentrating their attention mainly on static equilibrium
models
.
Today, with the use of computers, many simulations or
emulations can be run in very short order in attempts to make




D. NAVY INVENTORY LEVELS
The three levels of peacetime inventory for the Navy are
wholesale level, retail-intermediate level and retail-
consumer level. The wholesale level is the area of interest
to this thesis. At the wholesale level, the Item Manager
(IM) who works at an Inventory Control Point (ICP) —ASO and
SPCC for the Navy—has visibility and control of assets
nationwide. The retail-intermediate level inventory is
between wholesale and retail-consumer levels and supplies a
given geographic area (this category of material would reside
along with the wholesale material at an NSC, NSD, or NAS in
the Navy) . The retail-consumer level is material held
strictly for the unit's own use or consumption (the stores
onboard the vast majority of the Navy's ships)
.
In addition to the peacetime inventory levels, the Navy
is required to maintain war reserve material. The war
reserve material requirement is defined as "the total
material needed to sustain mobilization operations during the
period prescribed by DOD for war material planning purposes .
"
[Ref. 24 :p. 1-4] This is further broken down into two basic
segments, war reserve material and prepositioned war reserve
material, the difference being where the stock is physically
located. [Ref. 24:p. 1-4]
This thesis will address wholesale peacetime requirements
as well as war reserve material requirements in determining
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the correct amount of inventory that should be on hand or on
order
.
E. INVENTORY SYSTEMS IN USE
There are two basic questions which any inventory system
must answer. Such a management system must determine first,
when an order should be placed, and second, how much should
be ordered. [Ref. 30 :p. 1]
The oldest, and perhaps simplest inventory control system
is the "two-bin" system. This system uses two physical bins,
one bin which satisfies demand between receiving one order
and placing the next, and a second bin which contains enough
stock to satisfy probable demands during the replenishment
period. Whitin noted two advantages of the "two-bin" system;
they decrease the need for physical inventories as well as
reduce the need for maintaining a continuous inventory.
Disadvantages do exist with this system. These include the
fact that no trend data for sales is available. This system
also fails to quantify the best amount to actually order when
the first bin is empty. Additionally, opportunities for
freight or quantity discounts are lost by ordering items
separately. [Ref. 29:pp. 15-16]
Another inventory system in use is one in which the
"ordering cycle" plays a major factor. Generally, the
shorter the ordering cycle, the smaller the level of
inventory required relative to sales, and thus a quicker
stock turnover occurs . Another term for this system is "days
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of supply", as inventory levels are expressed in XX days of
supply at a fixed rate of demand. The setting of the exact
value for days of supply is based upon inputs such as; a
minimum inventory level, forecasted demand, time lag between
passing through the reorder point and placing the actual
order, the time the procurement system requires to
requisition stock, the vendor's required time to produce, and
the transportation time required.
Whitin, in his 1957 book, stated: [Ref. 29:p. 20]
Many inventory control systems in actual use have been
greatly simplified by using only one ordering cycle for all
classes of items. Some are further simplified by
establishing supply control levels on an across-the-board
basis
.
The across-the-board basis accurately described SPCC's
twelve-month minimum constraint for all order quantities up
until June 1987. This constraint on smaller EOQ orders
existed due to a desire to reduce the workload of SPCC's
contracting department. In June 1987, SPCC revised its
ordering policy to take advantage of both item demand trends
and quantity price discounts. Further discussions of SPCC's
new ordering policy are included in Chapter VI.
Whitin stated that in order to justify these across-the-
board levels, it was necessary to show that all items: [Ref.
29:p. 20]
1. have the same lag time, (the sum of manufacturing time,
posting time, transport time, etc.);
2
.
have the same variations in lag time;
3. have the same expected demand distribution;
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4. have the same cost of depletion;
5. have the same carrying charge (depreciation,
obsolescence, insurance, risk, storage, etc.)/
6. have the same costs involved in placing orders;
7. have the same quantity discounts.
Due to the nature of the business that SPCC is in, it is
apparent from the above list that across-the-board levels
were not truly justifiable, but were implemented anyway.
This apparently occurred due to a perceived, if not actual,
overwhelming work load on the contracting division.
The last inventory system in use to be described is a
combination of the two-bin and the ordering cycle systems
.
The Navy uses this type of control, as the current UICP
system operates just as the ordering cycle system previously
mentioned does, but with the addition of a safety stock.
This mixed system takes the best parts from both the two-bin
and the ordering cycle systems and eliminates some of the
problems from both systems. Due to the improved result that
this mixed system provides, as well as the fact that this is
what the current UICP is based upon, this thesis will
concentrate only on the Navy's mixed system.
F. INVENTORY PROCEDURES USED
There are two basic procedures used in implementing an
inventory system. The first is called perpetual, continuous
review, or transactions reporting. For purposes of this
thesis, this procedure will be called transactions reporting.
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The second is called periodic review. This section discusses
the differences between these two procedures
.
In the transactions reporting procedure, running totals
of material on-hand are kept by a transaction reporting
system for every item in order to determine the correct time
to reorder. Under this procedure, the quantity to order is a
predetermined amount based in part upon the economic order
quantity (EOQ) formula, which depends on expected demand,
holding cost rate, administrative order cost and material
cost
.
The EOQ model for determining the optimal order quantity
Q (for non-repairable items) when backorders are not
considered is:
Q = SQRT (8AD/IC)
where
SQRT= Square root of the quantity in brackets
A = The administrative order cost
D = Quarterly demand average
I = The holding cost rate including consideration of
investment cost, storage, obsolescence and losses
C = The replacement cost of the item
This formula has been called "the lot size formula, the
economic order quantity, the square root formula, or the
Wilson formula." [Ref. 30:p. 34] The term economic order
quantity (EOQ) will be used throughout this thesis.
Assumptions that the EOQ formula is based upon include:
[Ref. 31:pp. 497-498]
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1. Demand is known with certainty and is constant over
time
.
2. Lead time is zero; that is, an order is received at the
instant it is placed.




Inventory is replenished when inventory is exactly
zero. No safety stock is employed and no shortages
(stockouts) are allowed.
5. Inventory replenishment is instantaneous; that is, the
entire order is received in a single batch.
6. The order quantity is constant for each replenishment
order.
7. The problem involves a single-stage system.
8. There is an infinite time horizon.
9. All costs are constant over the infinite time horizon.
Additional assumptions were identified by Hadley and
Whitin for cases in which backorders were allowed. These
included assuming no interaction between items, unit cost
being constant and independent of order quantity, a constant
backorder cost, never more than one order outstanding, and a
positive reorder point. [Ref. 30:pp. 162-163]
The Reorder Level (RL) (for non-repairable items) is used
to determine exactly when to order the reorder quantity, Q,
that was determined using the EOQ formula. RL is a function
of the variability of demand, the lead time demand, and
economic considerations.
RL = (D x L) + SL
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where
D = Quarterly demand average
L = Procurement lead time in quarters
SL = Safety level, which is a function of demand and lead
time variability and the desired level of service
Figure 3-1 illustrates the basic characteristics of the
EOQ model in the transactions reporting procedure.
Figure 3-2 shows that the optimal Q occurs at the point
where the slope of the ordering cost curve is the negative of
the slope of the inventory carrying cost curve. Of interest
in Figure 3-2 is the fact that the slope to either side of
the optimal Q is relatively flat. This illustrates that
there is a good deal of "slop" allowed in the optimal Q
before total costs are changed drastically.
Using the periodic review procedure, a fixed time
interval is used to determine when to look at the inventory
position of each item. A "snapshot" is taken at that
specified time and a comparison is made of stock on hand or
on order to the item's Requisitioning Objective (RO) . The
difference between the "snapshot" on hand or on order and the
RO is placed on order. A higher average level of inventory
is required for the periodic review procedure as compared to
the transactions reporting procedure. This is due to the
requirement in the periodic review procedure to maintain an
increased safety stock level. The reason for this increased
safety stock is the requirement to hold not only enough





Requisition Objective = Reorder Point + EOQ
+ deficiency below reorder point
Figure 3- 1. Continuous Review Procedure
Reorder Quantity (Q units)










meeting the demands between hitting the reorder point and
reaching the end of that periodic cycle when the actual order
is placed. Figure 3-3 graphically represents the periodic
review procedure in operation.
The RO in the periodic review procedure must include at
least one review time demand period, one procurement lead
time demand period, and a safety level. The RO can be
defined algebraically as: [Ref. 24:pp. 1-15, 1-16]
RO = (D x L) + (D x R) + SL
where
:
D = Quarterly demand of the item.
L = The procurement lead time in quarters.
R = The length of the review period in quarters
.
SL = Safety level, a function of demand and lead time
variability and the desired level of service.
Although there is a higher investment cost due to the
increased investment level, a partial savings is obtained due
to less clerical and data processing costs. Hadley and
Whitin stated that the best use of the periodic review
procedure is on inexpensive items in which the review and
processing costs are high and the item investment and holding
costs are low. [Ref. 30:p. 235]
With the trend towards decreasing data processing costs,
there is more incentive to convert inventory systems to
transactions reporting. This way more timely changes in
demand can be quickly noted and the average investment in







Requisition Objective = Reorder Point + EOQ +
deficiency below
reorder point
Figure 3-3. Periodic Review Procedure
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"what really determines which system is to be preferred is
the cost of operating a transaction reporting system, as
compared with that of operating a periodic review system."
[Ref. 30:pp. 281-282]
G . SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a brief summary of some
important inventory management procedures . The fact that the
Navy's UICP model is a mixed inventory control system
supposedly working within the framework of a transactions
reporting procedure was discussed. Chapter VI will discuss
how the transactions reporting procedure is used at SPCC in
such a manner that, at times, it appears to be a periodic





Once there has been a determination made that indeed an
item is in long supply, and it is not that way purposely,
some action must be taken. The first alternative is to allow
the contract to continue until completion. The second
alternative would be to completely stop the procurement with
a complete termination of the contract. The third
alternative is to partially terminate the contract, thus
allowing for partial delivery of some of the contracted
items. Although the majority of this Chapter deals with
complete terminations, partial terminations would use similar
procedures for the quantity canceled. When discussing the
costs involved in the decision process, Chapter V will
briefly touch on the distinction between partial and complete
contract terminations.
B. TYPES OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
In Government contracts there are four means by which to
terminate a contract prior to its completion. They are:
1. Termination for Default,
2. Termination for Convenience,
3. No-cost settlement, or
4
.
Failure to provide additional funds under the
Limitation of Cost or Limitation of Funds clause when
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the available funds have been expended and the work is
incomplete [Ref. 32:p. 524].
Termination for Default:
a. Fixed-price contracts [Ref. 33: 49.402-1]
The Government has the right to terminate the contract
completely or partially for default if the contractor fails
to
:
(i) make delivery of the supplies or perform the
services within the time specified in the contract,
(ii) perform any other provision of the contract, or
(iii) make progress and that failure endangers
performance of the contract.
b. Cost-reimbursement contracts [Ref. 33: 49.403]
The Government must provide a 10 day notice to the
contractor before termination for default.
c. Potential problems which can develop when a
termination for default on contracts for items in long supply
is enacted include: [Ref. 34 :p. 184]
(i) if any advance or progress payments have been paid to
the contractor for work not yet performed, they must
be recovered,
(ii) the procuring contracting officer (PCO) must send
representatives to the contractor's work location and
account for all work (thus far) accomplished, and
(iii) many contractors take the Federal Government to court
(claiming breach of contract by the Federal
Government) , thus delaying the termination process
even further.
2. Termination for Convenience:
Terminations for convenience usually are enacted
when: [Ref. 34:p. 19]
a. the Federal Government is no longer in need of the
product being manufactured (e.g. the spare parts which
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are already in stock are in excess of new
requirements)
,
b. there has been a change in the specifications
(engineering changes) for the contracted item,
c. there is a change in political policy (e.g. ultimate
disapproval of SST's),
d. there is poor contract administration,
e. there has been a "bad buy" (improperly justified,
impossibility of performance, or insufficiently
researched requirements), or
f. a termination for default is overturned by the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) and a
termination for convenience is awarded.
A major difference between convenience and default
terminations of cost-reimbursement type contracts is that a
contractor must be given a 10-day notice prior to termination





The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) state:
[Ref. 33: 49.101(b)]
The contracting officer shall effect a no-cost settlement
instead of issuing a termination notice when (1) it is
known that the contractor will accept one, (2) Government
property was not furnished, and (3) there are no
outstanding payments, debts due the Government, or other
contractor obligations.
4 Limitation of Cost and Limitation of Funds:
This method can be used by simply failing to provide
additional funds under the Limitation of Cost clause when the
available funds have been expended and the work is
incomplete. [Ref. 32 :p. 524]
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As this thesis is concerned with termination of
contracts for secondary items in long supply, the majority of
the contract terminations will be for the convenience of the
Government. Therefore the following section describes the
historical background of the use of convenience terminations.
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The ability of the Government to terminate a contract for
its convenience, whether or not the contractor is at fault,
was developed primarily as a "wartime concept, and it was a
way for the government to avoid the continuance of contracts
that the rapid changes of war, or the war's end, had made
useless or senseless." [Ref. 35:p. 9] The right of the
Government to terminate a contract for its convenience and
enter into a settlement agreement was established by the
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Corliss Steam
Engine Company in 1875 [Ref 36] . The approval of the
negotiated settlement of the Corliss claim was the foundation
of the "termination and settlement policy which was to become
such an important aspect of future government procurement."
[Ref. 37:p. 3] In this case, [Ref. 38:p. 1-2]
...the Navy instructed a contractor to discontinue work on
a contract for engines and boilers required during the
Civil War. Under the existing contract, there were no
provisions authorizing the termination. The Corliss Engine
Company offered to settle all of its claims on the basis of
either retaining the machinery in process and receiving a
settlement of $150,000, or delivering the incomplete
machinery to the Charleston Navy Yard for $259,000.
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The Navy decided to accept the delivery of the incomplete
machinery. Unfortunately, the Navy had no appropriation
money available to pay for this option, so a certificate of
indebtedness was issued instead. The Comptroller of the
Treasury declined to accept the certificate on the grounds
that "the settlement was not fair and reasonable and the
contracting officer had no legitimate authority to enter into
such an agreement." [Ref. 37 :p. 3] Congress then got
involved by passing legislation that prevented the use of
annual appropriations for ship-building to pay the previously
agreed amount and instructed the Navy to deduct from the
contract price the sum it would have cost Corliss to complete
the contract. The Navy then determined that Corliss should
be paid $140,978. Corliss appealed to the Court of Claims
stating that the certificate of indebtedness of $259,000
should be honored. The Court of Claims found in favor of
Corliss since no fraud or misrepresentation was proven. The
Government appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme
Court held that the original settlement was binding on the
Government and therefore could not be challenged. [Ref. 36]
The next major war was World War I, during which the
Corliss doctrine grew to become a very important part of
military procurement. In 1917 Congress passed the Urgent
Deficiency Appropriation Act [Ref. 39]. This Act was in
response to a "two-pronged concern that the government not
have to remain committed for obsolete items during the war or
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for stockpiles of items at the war's end." [Ref. 35 :p. 10]
The Act authorized the President, until six months after a
final treaty of peace "(t)o modify, suspend, cancel, or
requisition any existing or future contract for the building,
production, or purchase of ships or material." [Ref. 39] In
such case, the Government was to make "just compensation
therefor." [Ref. 39]
Besides the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, special
contract clauses were used. One example is in Davis Sewing
Machine Co. v. United States [Ref. 40] which involved a
contract for the procurement of Very pistols. The
termination clause stated, [Ref. 40]
This contract being necessitated by a state of war now
existing, it is desirable and expedient that provision be
made for its cancellation upon termination or limitation of
the war, or if in anticipation thereof or because of
changes in methods of warfare the Chief of Ordnance should
be of the opinion that the completion of this contract has
become unnecessary. It is therefore provided that any
time, and from time to time, during the currency of this
contract, the Chief of Ordnance may for any of the clauses
above stated notify the contractor that any part or parts
of the articles then remaining undelivered shall not be
manufactured or delivered.
As stated in Torncello , the intent of both the statute
and the contract clause was [Ref. 35 :p. 11]
...just to handle changed conditions, relieving the
government of the risk of receiving obsolete or useless
goods. The risk was shifted to the contractor that it
could lose the full benefit of its expectations if
circumstances changed too radically.
By 1922, $505 million had been paid to retire World War I
contracts which if allowed to run to completion would have
cost nearly $4 billion. [Ref. 41:p. 200]
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World War II brought with it the Contract Settlement Act
of 1944. The objectives of this Act were to achieve maximum
war production, expedite reconversion to civilian production
after the war, permit timely settlements, and ensure
uniformity among Governmental agencies. [Ref 42]
This policy provided for a post-termination process of
arriving at a fair and responsible settlement amount through
negotiation. This Act was used to achieve approximately
319,000 terminations for convenience during the period of 1
July 1944 until 31 March 1947. [Ref. 41 :p. 208]
For Government defense contracts entered into after 19
May 1948, the effective date of the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947 [Ref 43] , the Contract Settlement Act
of 1944 does not apply. The Armed Services Procurement Act
of 1947 established the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(ASPR) [Ref. 44] which provided the Government the right to
terminate contracts for convenience and made mandatory a
Termination for Convenience clause for most Government
contracts. [Ref. 44: 7-103.21] Even though the ASPR
required the Termination for Convenience clause to be
present, situations did occur where the clause was physically
left out. This problem area was rectified when the Court of
Claims issued an opinion which declared that since the
procurement regulations have the force and effect of law, a
contract could be considered to have the required termination
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for convenience clause incorporated even though it is not
physically present in the contract. [Ref. 45]
The termination provision, besides verifying the
Government's right to terminate "whenever the Contracting
Officer shall determine that such termination is in the best
interests of the Government," [Ref. 44: 7-103.21 (a)] also
specified again that the Government would not pay
anticipatory profits for what would otherwise be a common law
breach situation. [Ref. 44: 7-103 . 21 (e) (ii) (c) ] Duties of
both the contractor and contracting officer were also
specified. All was not negative for the contractor, as
according to the ASPR, he could be compensated for certain
types of costs which had been incurred even though no benefit
in the form of an end item was received by the Government
.
In January 1952, termination procedures and policies were
formally established in Section VIII of the ASPR [Ref. 41 :p.
208] . In November 1959, the termination principles were
changed slightly and were moved to Section XV of the ASPR.
The new location of the termination for convenience
principles became important with the issuance of Defense
Department Circular 79 of 15 May 1970. This circular added
fixed price contracts to Section XV which previously only
applied to cost-reimbursement type contracts [Ref. 46 :p.
875] . The importance of Section XV of the ASPR is that the
cost principles listed are those which are used in all
actions to claim, negotiate, or determine costs which are
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applicable to termination settlements [Ref. 44: 8-214].
These principles are specified in the Termination for
Convenience clause as being applicable to calculating the
termination settlement either through negotiations or by
unilateral decision of the contracting officer. [Ref. 44: 7-
103.21 (f)
]
Over time the ASPR was replaced by the Defense
Acquisition Regulations which continued to require the
mandatory Termination for Convenience clauses in the majority
of DOD contracts over $1,000 [Ref. 47: 8-701-705]. The
Defense Acquisition Regulations were replaced in 1984 by the
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) which continued to
require the broad use of Termination for Convenience clauses
[Ref. 33: 49.502] . Thus, over the years, the clauses which
originally were developed for war contracts are now applied
to all executive branches and to all types of contracts, both
in times of peace and of war.
Two important concepts have arisen from various Boards
and Court cases. As this thesis concerns the Armed Services,
only the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) and
the Federal Court of Claims (now called the U.S. Claims
Court) decisions will be reviewed.
The first concept is that the Government's motive for
terminating a contract is not an issue except in three
instances cited by Cibinic and Nash: [Ref. 48:pp. 822-825]
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a . Government Bad Faith
A contracting officer is not permitted to exercise
rights under the Termination for Convenience clause if
such exercise demonstrates bad faith...
b
.
No Change in Circumstances
In Ronald A. Torncello v. United States, 231 Ct . CI.
20,681 F.2d 756 (1982) [Ref. 35] the court ruled that
the Termination for Convenience clause could not be
used to avoid anticipated profits unless there had been
some change in circumstances between the time of award
of the contract and the time of termination...
c Violation of Paramount Government Policies
The courts have enjoined convenience terminations on
the grounds that they violate or avoid other Government
policies of paramount importance...
This motive issue is clearly seen in Thomas C. Wilson,
Inc. v. United States, 83-1 BCA 16,149, ASBCA No. 26035, p.
80,279, 16 November 1982 where:
A contract for the supply of tube repair plugs was
properly terminated for default because the contractor did
not make timely delivery. The Government's termination
under the default clause was not unconscionable, despite
the fact that it no longer needed the plugs. Inclusion of
the default clause and agreement to a specified delivery
date in the contract made time of the essence, even though
the Government no longer needed the plugs .... Government had
the right just the same as Wilson had the right to insist
on payment of the purchase price regardless of Wilson's
need or lack of need for such money if it performed in
accordance with the agreement.
The second concept is that the Government's right to
terminate for convenience is waived when the right to
terminate for default or accept a no-cost settlement is
present
.
In Artisan Electronics Corp., 73-1 BCA 9807, p. 45,820
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ASBCA No. 14154, 30 November 1972 this concept was clearly
stated:
Except for no cost cancellations, where the right to
terminate for default exists, the contracting officer not
only may, but, under the cited regulations of his agency,
must terminate for default if he is to terminate at all.
Under such circumstances he may not terminate for the
convenience of the Government.
This was again more recently declared in Control
Mechanisms, Inc., 83-1 BCA 16,155, ASBCA No. 27,180, p.
80,295 17 November 1982 when it was stated:
That (in the absence of bad faith) the Board normally
inquires into the existence of the right to terminate for
default, not the judgment leading to its exercise; and that
contracting officers are not authorized to terminate for
convenience, except at no cost to the government, when the
right to terminate for default exists, even if the supplies
contracted for are no longer required.
D. TERMINATION PROCEDURES
Assuming that the contracting officer has indeed decided
that it is in the best interest of the Government to
terminate the contract for the Government's convenience, FAR
49.102(a) provides that:
The contracting officer shall terminate contracts for
convenience or default only by a written notice to the
contractor (see 49.601) . When the notice is mailed, it
shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested.
When the contracting office arranges for hand delivery of
the notice, a written acknowledgement shall be obtained
from the contractor. The notice shall state:
(1) That the contract is being terminated for the
convenience of the Government (or for default) under
the contract clause authorizing the termination;
(2) The effective date of termination;
(3) The extent of termination;
(4) Any special instructions; and
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(5) The steps the contractor should take to minimize the
impact on personnel if the termination, together with
all other outstanding terminations, will result in a
significant reduction in the contractor' s work force
(see paragraph (g) of the notice in 49.601-2). If the
termination notice is by telegram, include these
"steps" in the confirming letter or "modification
.
When the Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO) prepares
and issues the termination notice to the contractor, a copy
should also be sent to the applicable contract administrative
agency. The majority of the contract administration
functions for DOD are handled by the Defense Contract
Administration Service (DCAS) , a branch of the Defense
Logistics Agency. DCAS has assigned the Termination
Contracting Officer (TCO) function to its nine DCAS Regions
(DCASRs) and has issued a manual, DLAM. 8110.1 titled
"Termination Manual for Contract Administration Services"
which: [Ref. 49 :p. i]
. . .prescribes policies and procedures for the guidance of
field personnel responsible for the settlement of contracts
which have been terminated in whole or in part for the
convenience of the Government.
The TCO commences the field administration of the
termination case upon receipt of a copy of the termination
notice by the appropriate DCASR office. The duties of the
TCO are listed in detail in sections 49.105 of the FAR, DFARS
and DLAM 8110.1. Of interest to both the PCO and his
financial managers is the fact that final termination
settlement proposals can take up to one year to be submitted,
plus the additional time required for negotiation in order to
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come to a final dollar figure [Ref. 33: 52 . 249-2 (d) ] . This
loss of potential obligation authority should be considered
in making the decision whether or not to terminate a
contract. Of interest to the PCO and TCO is a statement by
Cibinic and Nash that: [Ref. 48:p. 841]
...the effect of a termination for convenience is to
convert a fixed price contract into a cost reimbursement
contract as to the work performed up to the effective date
of the termination.
Another potential pitfall of terminating a contract is
the dispensation of the termination inventory, be it in fully
completed units, work-in-progress, or even raw material.
Additional costs can quickly exceed any expected savings once
the government finishes storing and stocking the items,
creating new Navy Item Control Numbers for partially
completed items, performing physical inventories, and




This chapter has provided background material on how
Terminations for Convenience were originated, as well as how
current statutes and legal case histories have set the tone
for use of these terminations in recent years.
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V. COSTS TO BE CONSIDERED
A. INTRODUCTION
It is frequently unclear if a purchase request or a
contract should be terminated. As the GAO has reported as
far back as 1957, IMs were not doing cost-benefit analysis
computations which compared the cost to terminate with the
cost to continue. This Chapter will identify and discuss
costs which need to be considered before making the "correct"
decision regarding secondary items in long supply.
While not easily defined as either a cost to continue or
as a cost to terminate, the most obvious cost incurred is the
difference between funds obligated and funds which can be
recovered for those items to be terminated. This dollar
amount varies from inconsequential to very substantial. As
will be discussed in Chapter VI, NAVSUP and SPCC have
recently begun collecting data on the correlation of elapsed
production lead time with the contractor's proposed cost to
terminate. This data collection eventually should assist IMs
in evaluating what dollar amount should be recovered if the
contract is terminated.
B. COSTS INCURRED BY CONTINUING THE CONTRACT
Administrative costs would not increase significantly
from those incurred when the original order was placed.
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Possibly the additional administrative cost would be in a.
series of telephone calls from the PCO to the Administrative
Contracting Officer (ACO) to confirm that indeed everything
was proceeding properly and to ensure timely delivery of the
item. This cost would probably be quite low and therefore
plays no real role in the decision to terminate.
A major factor in the decision whether to terminate or
not is the variable cost to hold inventory. This cost
consists of four factors; (1) the charge for investment of
capital tied up in inventory, (2) losses due to obsolescence,
(3) other losses of on-hand assets, and (4) storage costs
[Ref . 50:Encl. 4]
.
With regard to investment cost, DOD policy states that
"an annual investment charge of ten percent of the average
on-hand inventory value will be made." [Ref. 50: End. 4]
Recent Service and DOD-wide audits have used the current mean
treasury rate for bonds of 1 to 30 years instead of this ten
percent. The Air Force termination model and past GAO audits
of the Air Force reflect a quarterly changing interest rate
determination which is based upon the mean treasury rate for
bonds. NAVSUP's (Naval Supply Systems Command) tentative
9termination model uses the constant ten percent rate from
DOD Instruction 4140.39. With treasury rates below ten
percent for the present, NAVSUP's model would make holding
NAVSUP's model is termed tentative as it is currently
being programmed by FMSO for use on personal computers
.
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items in long supply more expensive and recommend more
terminations than the Air Force model
.
One modification to the investment cost figure which
might more accurately reflect the actual obligational
authority committed would be to multiply either an expected
interest rate or the ten percent by not only the average on-
hand inventory but also by the on-order dollar value as well.
In 1970 when the instruction was first written, PCLT probably
was 90 to 100 days, but now in these days of 750+ days of
PCLT, this additional investment cost should be used to more
accurately reflect the commitment of these funds which are no
longer available for alternative uses. The time to commence
charging this additional cost should be at the start of PLT.
At that moment, the funds have been obligated and therefore
are no longer available for other uses. Discounting this new
figure to reflect the present value of future dollars would
be even more precise, and would even more accurately reflect
this cost. These modifications, in the researchers opinion,
would better reflect the "true" investment cost.
The next cost is that of losses due to obsolescence.
Included in this category are losses due to "technological
obsolescence, over-forecasting of requirements, deterioration
beyond the point of use, and other causes" [Ref. 50:Encl.
4] . Here DOD policy is that each ICP will compute separate
obsolescence costs for each item it manages. Currently the
Navy's UICP uses an obsolescence rate of ten percent for
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repairables and twelve percent for consumables. NAVSUP's
tentative termination model uses a flat ten percent for
obsolescence. The Air Force uses two-and-a-half percent to
reflect not only the risk of obsolescence, but also to cover
the next cost category, other losses. Once again the Navy's
values will result in higher holding costs than the Air
Force's and thus in more terminations of contracts in long
supply. Obsolescence charges are not discounted as they
reflect the probability that what is bought today will be
obsolete when the Navy finally decides to use it, thus these
costs are incurred now.
The "other losses" category covers losses due to such
causes as pilferage, shrinkage, or inventory adjustments.
The basic Navy UICP treatment is to include this category in
the same flat ten percent charge as was discussed in the
above paragraph concerning obsolescence for both repairables
and consumables . UICP adds to that ten percent charge an
extra two percent charge for other losses to consumables.
This consumables-only charge appears quite logical since pens
and paper have many non-Navy applications while the
repairable left-handed low pressure main engine turbine blade
has no true non-Navy applications and is thus less likely to
disappear from the inventory. NAVSUP's tentative termination
model makes no use of this value and thereby understates the
cost to continue the contract, resulting in fewer
terminations being conducted on consumable items than in
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reality should be. The researcher feels this value should be
included in the Navy's termination model, and should be set
to zero for repairables but charged at two percent for
consumables to further enhance the model's value.
The last category of variable costs incurred in holding
an item is that of storage. This cost represents both the
day-to-day costs incurred in keeping the inventory as well as
the cost of actual storage facilities. This cost includes:
[Ref. 50:Encl 4]
...care of material in storage, rewarehousing costs, cost
of physical inventory operations, preservation and
packaging, training of storage personnel, cost of
warehousing equipment and pro-rated services and overhead
costs .
Both the Air Force and NAVSUP's tentative termination models
use DOD's recommended value for storage of one percent of the
average on-hand inventory value per year.
Another variable cost which should be addressed when
attempting to determine all applicable costs which are
incurred by continuing a contract is that of warehouse space
and security. DOD has not had to worry about this problem
until the recent past when GAO became interested in this
area. GAO is currently reporting that DOD is running out of
warehouse space and has poor security over what it has in
storage [Ref. 15]. How to apportion the cost of providing
adequate warehouse space and security to individual items or
contracts is unclear and therefore no attempt to quantify
this value for use in this thesis is attempted.
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By adding up the appropriate variable costs to hold, a
cost of holding figure can be derived. The next requirement
for the IM to determine in order to arrive at the proper
holding cost, is the length of time between the current
delivery date and the actual required delivery date. This
value is required to be in terms of years since that is how
holding costs are stated. The last dollar value required to
determine holding costs is the contract price of the units
considered for cancellation.
The cost-to-continue equation, while quite straight-
forward as a linear function of years until use and value, is
still sensitive to a subjective input: time until the items
will actually be required. Although the tentative NAVSUP
termination model uses 21% for its holding cost, the
researcher has chosen 25% to be the holding cost value for
the following examples. The reason for the additional four
per cent holding cost is to reflect a more realistic time
value of money for the investment segment, and an adjustment
to the "other losses" segment in order to more accurately
reflect consumable items losses.
The following examples illustrate the effect of changing
the subjective value of years until use:
Assume
:
Holding cost = .25
Value of units = $100,000
Years until use = 3.5
.25 X $100,000 X 3.5 = $87,500
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If the cost to terminate was less than $87,500, it would make
fiscal sense to terminate.
Suppose
:
Holding cost = .25
Value of units = $100,000
Years until use = 7
.25 X $100,000 X 7 = $175,000
In this situation, if the cost to terminate was less than
$175,000, it would make fiscal sense to terminate.
As the above examples illustrate, the only change is in
the expected time until use, yet a large dollar difference
occurs. A straightforward linear function, but one that both
IMs and their supervisors must be aware of in order to make
the best business decision concerning continuing or
terminating a contract.
In conclusion, the researcher feels that a more accurate
variable cost to hold could be achieved if the aforementioned
recommendations are followed. Instead of using a constant
21% in the termination model, two different values would be
produced, and most likely both would be greater than the
present 21% due to using both a more realistic time value of
money as well as an adjustment to the "other losses" category
for consumable items . How much greater would depend upon the
items PLT trend and whether the item was a consumable or not.
C. COSTS INCURRED BY TERMINATING THE CONTRACT
The researcher believes that the following costs are













Each of the ten costs above will be discussed in detail
in this section.
The first cost to be looked at is the additional
administrative costs incurred due to contract termination.
In the Air Force's termination model, a flat $250 is charged.
In NAVSUP 's tentative termination model, $2,000 is charged.
Both of these costs consider only the parent Service's costs
and not the labor and material used by the TCO and associated
personnel from the cognizant DCASR.
Of importance to making the best decision concerning
whether to terminate or not, is an understanding of how
administrative costs are funded by NAVSUP . NAVSUP has
recently begun funding its' field activities, of which SPCC
is one, using a budget execution process called PURS
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(Productive Unit Resourcing System). 10 Using PURS, NAVSUP
funds its' activities Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
requirements on the basis of actual work performed, as
opposed to funding based upon the costs -which were previously
incurred, as was previously done. The PURS divides
procurement functions into the following categories:
1. Actual buying,
2. Contract administration, and
3c Procurement overhead.
Nowhere in the instruction are any details provided as to how
the administrative costs involved in a contract termination
are reimbursed to the field activity.
During the researcher's thesis travel to NAVSUP,
discussions concerning this point were held with the
cognizant personnel in both the financial (NAVSUP 012) and
contracting (NAVSUP 02) divisions. No detailed records
documenting the additional administrative costs of
terminations had been presented to NAVSUP to date. It was
felt, by personnel contacted at NAVSUP, that these costs
would be reflected in a rapidly increasing percentage of time
and effort showing up in the contract administration segment
of the PURS figures. Unfortunately, the figures submitted by
SPCC to NAVSUP, as required by PURS, do not reflect this.
The following figures, broken down by size of procurement,
10NAVSUPINST 7000. 21A dated 12 DEC 1986 is the current
instruction which governs the management of this system.
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indicate what SPCC has reported over the past three fiscal







Even should SPCC s contract administration figures
continue to increase, the funds available for distribution
through PURS as a whole are being adversely affected by the
current austere budgets . The change in funding of the entire
PURS budget at NAVSUP between fiscal years 1987 and 1988
reflected a decrease of five percent. Between fiscal years
1988 and 1989 it is estimated that an additional ten percent
will be cut from the already reduced level of PURS funding.
[Ref. 52]
One of the TCC s from DCASR Chicago has recommended that
the termination be treated as a contract modification. She
estimated that the average modification costs only $350 as
compared to the Navy's $2,000 [Ref. 53]. In addition to this
drastic dollar difference, the "color" of money used is
different. Navy operational funds would be used if the Navy
terminated while DLA operational funds would be used if they
issued the modification while in their role as ACO
.
Additional research will be required into statute, regulation
and case law to see if indeed this is a viable option to be
pursued. It is the researcher's opinion that in this era of
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decreasing operational dollars, the Navy should investigate
opportunities such as this. Although some of the Navy's
money would still be used to reflect the IM' s time and effort
required to determine whether to terminate or not, and the
buyer's need to do some basic work, possibly the $2,000 could
be cut in half, thereby lowering the cost to terminate.
The second cost to be considered is that of the actual
settlement costs. Since most of the secondary item contracts
are of the fixed-price type, FAR 49.206 is the applicable
section on what process to be used. The settlement proposal
itself is normally required within one year of the
termination date unless the TCO authorizes an extension. FAR
4 9.108-7 provides for the Government assisting the prime
contractor in settling his termination claims from his sub-
contractors .
The two main bases for settlement proposals are the
inventory basis (preferred) or the total cost basis. Another
settlement method which may be used is that of settlement by
determination. As stated in FAR 49. 109-7 (a):
If the contractor and TCO cannot agree on a termination
settlement, or if a settlement proposal is not submitted
within the period required by the termination clause, the
TCO shall issue a determination of the amount due
consistent with the termination clause, including any cost
principles incorporated by reference.
However the settlement is achieved, the dollar amount might
also be called the "termination fee" as in NAVSUP's tentative
termination model. This cost, divided by the original
contract price for the items terminated, is plotted against
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the percent of PLT completed to develop basic "rules of
thumb" for NAVSUP ICPs to utilize in deciding whether to
terminate or not. Two points must be remembered with respect
to settlement costs; first, the settlement cost may not
exceed the contract price [Ref. 33: 49.207] and second, that
the TCO: [Ref. 33: 49.202(a)]
...shall allow profit on preparations made and work done by
the contractor for the terminated portion of the contract
but not on the settlement expenses. Anticipated profits
and consequential damages shall not be allowed ....
The third cost is that of the effect of items in long
supply on the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) surcharge. The
surcharge, along with DOD's Price Stabilization Factor (PSF)
(to be discussed with the eighth cost, inflation) is applied
against each item's cost in order to establish the standard
price which consuming units must pay. The surcharge exists
as an effort for the NSF to recover from losses due to
obsolescence and physical losses, as well as pay for
transportation costs. As more of the "wrong" items end up in
stock, the NSF surcharge must be increased to reflect the
obsolescence and physical losses to be expected. As was
discussed in the previous section, the Navy's UICP assumes
obsolescence and losses as ten percent for repairables and
twelve percent for consumables. The exact percent increase
in NSF surcharge is dependent upon the percent of dollars
invested in items in a long supply status relative to the
total dollars of NSF items. Over time, the long supply items
suffer an increasing percentage of obsolescence and physical
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losses since some of this inventory never gets used or has
its shelf life expire. These situations result in the
requirement for an increased NSF surcharge to recover these
costs incurred. By reducing the quantity of items in a long
supply status by terminating contracts for items in in this
status, the NSF surcharge can be maintained at its present
percentage or possibly even decreased. Thus the cost here
would be in fact a cost avoidance, thus encouraging more
terminations of contracts for items in a long supply status.
The fourth cost is that of dollars tied up in termination
inventory. The first concern of the TCO once a termination
has been ordered is to have the contractor stop work, stop
his sub-contractor' s work, and then have the contractor
identify what he believes is termination inventory. As
stated by the FAR, the TCO must perform the following
functions regarding termination inventory: [Ref. 33:
49.105 (b) (4)
]
(i) Verify its existence
(ii) Determine qualitative and quantitative allocability
(iii) Make recommendations concerning serviceability
(iv) Undertake necessary screening and redistribution
(v) Assist the contractor in accomplishing other
disposition
.
If, as is the norm, the TCO comes from a DCASR, DLAM 8110.1
provides detailed coverage of what the TCO is responsible for
concerning termination inventory [Ref. 49: 49.105].
Costs incident to the transfer or storage of the
termination inventory, including packing, crating and
handling services, and transportation, are considered
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settlement expenses which are normally allowable [Ref. 33:
45.608-7] . These costs should be added to the contractor's
termination fees in order to more realistically know the cost
to terminate.
The factor that is never addressed in a quantitative
formula is how to value the costs the Navy incurs once the
termination inventory is received. Elements that should be
addressed include: (1) receipt, (2) creation of control
numbers for incomplete parts received, (3) physical storage
area taken up by these items, (4) warehousing costs, (5)
physical inventory problems, and (6) ultimate disposal.
While completed units can be easily accounted for and
hopefully used as Government furnished material in future
contracts instead of paying the contractor to make or buy
these parts, this normally is not the case. Unfortunately
the majority of items received will probably just take up
shelf-space until a final decision is made to dispose of
them.
The fifth cost element is that of disposal. There are
two ways in which an item from the wholesale inventory ends
up being sent to disposal. The first is as a result of the
twice-a-year stratification. The second is from the running
of the monthly Change Notice program. The stratification
recommendations are sent to the IM prior to any actual
disposal action taking place. Here the IM can interject her
knowledge about the item in question that might not be shown
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by running the stratification program. Unfortunately, the
monthly Change Notice run is not given to the IM, as an
engineering evaluation has determined that there is no
further application for the item and therefore there is no
need to retain the item. [Ref. 54:pp. C-l,C-2]
As far as the cost for disposal when the contract is
terminated goes, the termination inventory or items no longer
meeting the Navy's needs are what should be considered. DLAM
8110.1 section 49.105 describes for the TCO what the
contractor should do to minimize the need for the Navy to
dispose of the items. Once the TCO has determined what of
the termination inventory will be offered to the Government
by the contractor, the PCO and IM must decide if the
Government could use any or all of it. If the Government
cannot use any of the termination inventory received in an
"as is" condition, then that material should be turned into
the Defense Reutilization System. If the material is turned
directly into the reutilization system, the costs of
warehousing, cataloging, pilferage, and advertising are borne
by DLA. If the Navy takes the items, the costs involved
would be the same as termination inventory with the addition
of documenting, rehandling, updating records and transporting
the item eventually to the Defense Reutilization System. The
potential costs that this disposal action would entail should
be a factor added into both sides of the equation. If the
contract is terminated, the cost of disposing of the
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termination inventory, less the dollars recovered, should be
determined. If the contract is allowed to run to it's
completion, then the eventual cost of disposing of the
finished items, less the dollars recovered should be
determined. The appropriate value should be added to the
proper side of the equation to more accurately reflect the
cost of that decision.
The sixth cost is that of goodwill. Although a dollar
figure might be hard to choose, it is a factor that should be
included in the cost to terminate. The researcher's concern
in this area is the effect of terminations for convenience on
small business firms. In Reinheimer' s and Melitz's thesis
[Ref. 37] concerning this area, an Air Force TCO stated that
problems created included: [Ref. 37 :p. 32]
...long time delays for the process of terminating for
convenience by the government, and lack of knowledge or
understanding by the civilian contractors of the rules and
procedures of termination for convenience.
Another Air Force TCO identified four effects on small
business
:
1. economic hardships due to the loss of expected cash
flow;
2. the stigma of having the Government terminate one of
their contracts;
3. belief that the Government is mad at them for something
they either did or did not do; and
4. the massive amount of paperwork involved [Ref. 37:
p. 33]
The contractors interviewed expressed four specific
problems. These were:
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1. amount of lost time and effort due to the termination
process;
2. not being allowed all overhead costs in the settlement;




their lack of understanding of the rules and
regulations governing termination for convenience [Ref.
37:p. 37]
Goodwill of the small firms, which the Navy is trying to
cultivate on one hand, is lost due to the time lag and amount
of paperwork involved. The Government does not allow
anticipatory cash flows and does not reimburse the contractor
for his time and effort required to drum up replacement
business [Ref. 37 :p. 37] . In times of economic hardships,
contractors might be upset, but if that's the only game in
town, they probably will continue to do business with the
Government. When prosperity returns is the time that the
effects of previously lost goodwill will most likely show up.
Contractors will remember what happened to them before and
avoid Government work if at all possible. Thus the loss of
goodwill should be included in the cost to terminate a
contract, but the mechanism to do so consistently will be
difficult to create.
The seventh cost is that of potential reprocurement . As
was pointed out when discussing the cost to continue a
contract, the appropriate time until it is necessary to
reprocure is a very subjective value. Costs involved here at
first appear only to be those that would be incurred in any
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other order. But the real cost involves not only the actual
unit price, but the potential losses from quantity discounts,
if any, forfeited by terminating the contract. Potential
future material shortages or expected price escalations
should be factors in this decision as well. Great care must
be taken to ensure realism in establishing this value or the
entire equation could be skewed either direction.
The eighth cost is that of inflation. While not a major
factor in the past few years, this could have a substantial
effect on the cost to terminate, should double digit
inflation reoccur. The current Navy Stock Fund surcharge
includes a factor for inflation. This factor is called DOD's
Price Stabilization Factor (PSF) . Since no one has a crystal
ball, values for inflation being used to forecast future
budgets should also be applied here. Specifically, if the
item is known to be required in X years, an estimate of what
its cost to procure will be then, versus what would it cost
to continue the contract now is important. The difference
(fully discounted to reflect present value) must be added to
the cost to terminate to fully realize its effect.
The ninth cost is that of loss of the production base.
Again this is a difficult cost to quantify, as the real cost
does not occur now, but rather years down the line when an
attempt is made to compete and either one or no bids are
received. The reason this cost is a cost to terminate is
that if contracts were allowed to continue, the potential
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exists for companies to keep the manufacturing capability as
they have some type of "track record" other than
"terminated .
"
The tenth and last cost is that of item migration. SPCC
uses different item mission essentiality codes (IMECs) to
differentiate between the importance of having various items
on hand. As an item gains a demand history, it might move up
or down in IMEC or even be transferred from SPCC to DLA. If
an item is trending upward, probably the best decision would
be to continue the contract since demand is actually
increasing and some of the contract's PCLT has already
passed. Conversely, if the item is trending downward, the
best decision would probably be to terminate since the
quantity in long supply will probably only increase. If the
item was actually migrating to another Service or to DLA and
was currently in long supply, coordination would have to be
made with the acquiring activity to see what their supply
status was before taking any further action.
D . SUMMARY
This Chapter has identified some of the relevant costs
which should be considered when making a decision whether to
terminate a contract or not. Chapter VI will take some of
the concepts and costs discussed in this Chapter and relate
them to what the Navy is currently doing concerning secondary
items in long supply.
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VI. CURRENT NAVY EFFORTS
A. INTRODUCTION
As was previously stated in Chapter II, that for all of
DOD, secondary items identified as being in "excess" grew
almost 200 percent ($10.2 billion in 1981 to $29.5 billion in
1987) in a period of six years. With the increased emphasis
that upper level Navy management has given to long supply, it
would be reasonable to expect that changes have been made and
are continuing to be made in an attempt to halt the trend of
increasing items in long supply. This Chapter discusses
actions in process by both NAVSUP and SPCC which address the
problem of secondary items in long supply.
B. NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND'S TERMINATION MODEL
The current NAVSUP termination model is being designed so
as to work on a personal computer (PC) . The Navy Fleet
Material Support Office (FMSO) , the control activity for and
resident experts on the UICP, has been tasked by NAVSUP to
provide the programming expertise needed to create the
necessary software to run NAVSUP' s termination model on the
PC. In addition to programming the PC, FMSO has been directed
by NAVSUP to include the models methodology in the UICP




NAVSUP' s PC termination model is based upon the concepts
SDR uses to make a recommendation to terminate. The first
filter that NAVSUP has used in their model is a $10,000
threshold value of contracts recommended for termination. If
the item passes this filter, a manual input of contractor
proposed termination fees must be entered before any other
computations can be conducted. The model itself is the same
basic attempt as Chapter V was addressing, a simple economic
cost-benefit analysis of the cost to continue the contract
versus the cost to terminate the contract. The termination
equation is presented below with the left side of the
equation being the cost to continue and the right side of the
equation being the cost to terminate:
(I x R x HP
X )
+ (S x QT x HP S ) + (0 x QT x HPQ ) vs CTF + ADM
+ (F x Min {Q,QT } x HPF )
1 . Cost to continue
NAVSUP 's model uses three independent terms in order
to derive the cost to continue the contract. The first term
is the investment cost which is determined using the
following formula:
I x R x HP j
Where
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I = interest rate (.10 annual, or .025 per quarter
as used in this equation)
R = dollars and dollar value of material which
potentially would be returned by the contractor
to the Navy after termination
HP = average length of time that the stock of excess
material will be held before it is used (how
long it will take until the funds invested will
be recovered) , in quarters
= TRL + ALT
Where
TRL = estimated time to reach reorder level after
termination, in quarters
ALT = administrative lead time, in quarters
All of the quantities above are subject to
uncertainty as to how values should be obtained for them.
The R figure will have to be the estimate which either the
PCO or TCO derive once the contractor's estimated termination
costs (termed contractor termination fees, CTF, in the cost
to terminate segment of the equation) are known. In the
researcher' s opinion, there exists no motivation in the
termination process for the contractor to estimate his fees
in a realistic manner. If his proposed termination fees are
higher then the eventual settlement, the R value will have
been set too low. This low dollar value will artificially
lessen the cost to continue while artificially inflating the
cost to terminate. The next quantity, HPy, is another
estimate, this time the value is estimated by the IM. It is
11For purposes of this equation, the value R reflects the
difference in dollars between the awarded contract price and
the unrecoverable costs (plus a reasonable profit) already
incurred by the contractor. This difference, in dollars,




the researcher's opinion that this value might be estimated
to be lower than it eventually turns out to be. The reason
for this is that the IM would not want to have a large value
of HPj, as this might lead her supervisor into more indepth
reviews of other decisions the IM makes. Although the
researcher has no evidence that this does indeed occur, the
basic human behavior of conflict avoidance would support this
view. If this were to hold true, a smaller than actual HPj
would lessen the investment cost to continue. In summary,
the investment cost element will probably result in an
understated value for the cost to continue the contract.
Next we examine the total storage cost, assuming that
the contract is continued. This value is determined by:
Where
S x QT x HP,
S = storage rate (.01 annual, or .0025 per quarter
as used in this equation)
QT = total dollar value of termination quantity
HP S = average length of time that the stock of excess
material will be stored before it is used, in
quarters
= TRL + PDLTe + ALT
Where
TRL = estimated time to reach reorder level
after termination, in quarters
PDLT = elapsed production lead time (difference
between current Julian date and contract
award Julian date in quarters)
ALT = administrative lead time, in quarters
The QT value is a factual matter which is not subject
to tinkering by either the TCO or contractor to any great
extent as it is determined by comparing the quantity to be
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terminated to the total contract price. QT normally is
determined simply by dividing the total contract price by the
total items called for in the contract, then multiplying this
unit price by the quantity terminated. The only major factor
which would have to be looked at on a case-by-case basis is
that of the contractor' s set-up costs and how they were
depreciated.
The HPo value again is a subjective, best guess
value. If it is set low, the cost to continue would be
lowered, thus less contracts would be processed for
termination.
One term which the researcher believes should be
included in this cost area is that of the added costs
associated with the storage of shelf life and hazardous
materials. The model at present fails to address the added
costs of these circumstances
.
The last term in the cost to continue segment is that
of obsolescence. The present termination model determines
the obsolescence value by using the following formula:
x QT x HPQ
Where
= obsolescence rate (.10 annual, or .025 per
quarter as is used in this equation)
QT = total dollar value of termination quantity
HPq = average length of time that the stock of excess
material will be stored before it is used or
becomes obsolete
= TRL + PDLTe
Where
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= elapsed production lead time (difference
between current Julian date and contract
award Julian date, in quarters)
As was discussed in Chapter V, the researcher believes
that this segment would be the ideal location to add in the
additional two percent "other losses" value for consumable
items
.
Since the QT value here is the same as for the storage
rate, the same logic applies to this figure.
The HPq value is another subjective value. In these
days of rapid technological breakthroughs in various
electronic fields, what originally was believed to be able to
survive for ten years might end up being replaced in two
years by a cheaper, more capable item. The IM, along with
various other Weapon Systems Group personnel must think
thoroughly before an arbitrary value is assigned, due to the
impact this value has on the cost to continue segment.
2 . Cost to terminate
The cost to terminate in the Navy's model also is
comprised of three separate terms, which when added together
give a specific dollar value as the cost to terminate. This
value can then be compared to the cost to continue. If the
cost to continue is higher than the cost to terminate, the
economic decision should be to terminate.
The first value is simply that of CTF, contractor
termination fees. This value is provided by the contractor.
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Again the researcher believes that there is no real benefit
for the contractor to be "realistic", as this might adversely
affect their ability to negotiate a settlement value which is
acceptable. The higher the value of CTF, the lower the
resulting R value. This higher CTF value makes it appear
more expensive to terminate then is really the case after a
termination settlement is finally reached.
The second term is that of ADM, administrative cost
to terminate a contract ($2,000 in the Navy's model) . As was
discussed in Chapter V, the Air Force uses $250 in their
termination model while a DCASR TCO input indicated that $350
would be appropriate if the termination was handled as a
contract modification. The following costs for SPCC to award
a contract (which should be approximately the same as to
terminate a contract) are listed in priority order of use and





Thus while the most frequently used contract types, purchase
orders and delivery orders, only cost $660, the NAVSUP model
still uses the flat $2,000 value.
The researcher believes that the ADM term could more
accurately reflect the actual costs involved if more weight
was given to the vast majority of contracts which are
processed at a cost of $660/contract . If further research
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Est.
9-83 9-84 9-85 9-86 9-87
$230 $390 $660 $660 $660
230 390 660 660 660
900 1080 1940 1940 2027
930 1110 1970 1970 1700
shows that the DCASR recommended use of contract
modifications, at $350/modification, could accomplish the
majority of terminations, at that time a weighted average
could be used to arrive at a more realistic ADM value.
Either way, it appears that NAVSUP's current value for ADM of
$2, 000/contract is too high and should be lowered to more
accurately reflect the actual costs incurred.
The last term attempts to account for inflation on
future purchases. This term is given by the following
formula:
F x Min(Q or QT ) x HPp
Where
F = inflation rate (.04 annual, or .01 per quarter as
used in this equation)
Q = dollar value of the economic order quantity
(EOQ)
QT = total dollar value of termination quantity
HPp = average length of time that the stock of excess
material will be held before it is used
considering the effects of inflation, in quarters
= TRL + PDLTe + ALT
Where
TRL = estimated time to reach reorder level after
termination, in quarters
PDLT = elapsed production lead time (difference
between current Julian date and contract
award Julian date, in quarters)
ALT = administrative lead time, in quarters
Although F, the inflation rate, is only an estimate,
as long as it reflects the current administrative estimates,




One specific constraint set by NAVSUP on HP F , is that
when that value is greater than 20 years, the inflation
factor (F) is set to zero. This results in the entire
inflation value of the equation becoming zero so that only
CTF and ADM will have any effect on the equation.
3 . Input requirements for the termination model
A potential problem with this model is the amount of
input required of the IM. As there are only 150 IMs to cover
the approximately 500,000 items managed by SPCC, every moment
of the IM/ s time is valuable. Unless the following "laundry
list" of required IM inputs is lessened, or automated, this
proposed NAVSUP termination model will probably be pushed
aside in order to take care of the most pressing issues (at
that time) . The following inputs must be made by the IM for
each individual item considered for termination:





4 administrative lead time
5. production lead time
6. procurement lead time
7. contract award date (Julian)
8. current Julian date
9. on hand RFI assets
10. on hand NRFI assets






14. total PPRs over procurement lead time
15. dollar value EOQ
16. backorders
17. due out
18. quarterly demand forecast quantity
19. quarterly regenerations forecast quantity
These required inputs are rife with the potential for
communication breakdowns as the IM does not maintain all this
information. Somehow the IM would have to let other people
know what she requires and get the proper reply in a timely
fashion in order to use this model.
Until a track record is established and "rules of
thumb" are derived, attempting to quantify the required
inputs will involve a lot of guesswork.
The implications of the various "what ifs" were
discussed when explaining how each term of the NAVSUP
termination model was used. The researcher's recommended
changes to the individual terms of the equation might correct
some problems with this model, but coming up with a specific
dollar "savings" or "cost" might be hard to support due to
its subjective sources. As in any business decision, the
best business decision should be made regardless of what the
model's final dollar figure is due to the model's reliance
upon many subjective values. This is the point that many
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auditors appear to overlook. The world of budgeting and
inventory requirements determination is full of potential
pitfalls (in this case improper subjective values), and the
more time that the IM spends looking over her shoulder the
greater the potential for falling into another unseen trap.
4 . Summary
In summary, the NAVSUP termination model is a good
first attempt at trying to do what GAO has been asking for:
actually comparing the cost to hold versus the cost to
terminate items in long supply. Unfortunately, many of the
inputs to this model are subjective and therefore hard to
substantiate to an auditor who has the ability to confront
the Navy with knowledge obtained through 20/20 hindsight.
If this model is ultimately included in the UICP,
hopefully the amount of input required of the IM will drop
substantially. Otherwise IMs will continue to use this model
only while management's interest in items in long supply is
high and will allow the model to be forgotten with the next
crisis
.
C. NAVY SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER TERMINATION CRITERIA
SPCC has taken an aggressive approach towards reducing
the number of items which are allowed to remain on order
while in a long supply condition. Appendix C describes in
detail the actual termination procedures which the IMs are
currently using. The first requirement that must be met
prior to using SPCC's termination procedures is that the
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dollar value of excess material for the item in question must
exceed $10,000. Although not clearly stated in SPCC's
procedure, the $10,000 figure which must be exceeded prior to
any action being taken was not arbitrarily established.
Personnel at SPCC examined cases where stratification was
identifying excesses and noted that first, only 1.3% of the
total contract dollars at SPCC came from contracts valued at
less than $10,000. Secondly, a review of all contract
actions revealed that 69.8% of SPCC's total contract actions
were for contracts valued at less than $10,000. The third
factor looked at was SDR "churn." The concern here was that
by terminating contracts with total values less than $10,000,
requirements would change between SDRs and the IMs would be
ordering and cancelling the same item, time after time.
[Ref. 27]
Once the $10,000 dollar value of excess material had been
established, the termination work group, which was comprised
of members from all affected codes at SPCC, worked together
to ensure the problem of items in long supply continued to be
treated as an actual problem and not just paid "lip service"
as other programs in the Navy have been in the past. The
effort to gain the upper hand on items in long supply can be
seen by the following statistics on DT (Due-in Termination)
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Appendix D illustrates two of SPCC's contracting department's
efforts to better control the termination process.
The extent of the long supply problem at SPCC was cited
by the GAO in their January 1988 report on the Navy [Ref . 1]
.
In this report it was noted that items estimated to be in
long supply were as follows (dollars in millions) : [Ref. l:p.
15]
Type of Material Fiscal Year
1986 1987 1988
Consumable $757.9 1,158.9 1,239.6
Repairable $3,731.2 3,941.1 4,018.2
While the amounts are indeed large, the researcher believes
the trend is more important. For consumables, there was a
$401 million increase between 1986 and 1987 while only a
$80.7 million increase is projected between 1987 and 1988.
This is a drop from the 52.9% increase between 1986 and 1987
to approximately 7% between 1987 and 1988. The repairables
as well show this trend, a $209.9 million increase between
1986 and 1987 as compared to $77.1 million estimated between
1987 and 1988. In percentages, from a 5.6% increase from
1986 to 1987 to approximately a 2% increase estimated between
1987 and 1988.
Looking at the actual stratification values, once again a
decreasing trend is seen:
98
Consum.
($000) SEP82 SEP83 SEP84 SEP85 SEP86 SEP87
DILS 45,811 83,259 143,578 150,214 118,384 100,121
% 8.4 14.6 20.1 18.6 16.1 13.7
Repair.
($000)
DILS 126,946 252,360 268,294 444,575 245,978 229,042
% 14.9 20.9 18.7 20.2 12.9 11.5
note DILS = contracts due in long supply
% = $ total DILS contracts/ $ total contracts
NAVSUP has set goals of 8% DILS for consumable items and 7%
DILS for repairable items. As can be seen from the above
figures, SPCC is working aggressively to achieve these goals.
As the fiscal faucets were opened in the early 1980'
s
after the "decade of neglect, " many items were finally
procured. Unfortunately the items bought included items
which ultimately entered a long supply condition. Before
SPCC should be harshly condemned for buying the wrong items,
the system (wholesale) material availability (SMA) should be
examined. In September 1980, the consumable items' SMA was
approximately 75%. In September 1987, the consumable items'
SMA was approximately 86%. In April 1981, the repairable
items' SMA was approximately 55%. In April 1987, the
repairable items SMA was approximately 82%. Throughout all
time periods discussed, the SMA goal had remained a
consistent 85%. Thus part of the cost of achieving a higher
SMA appears to have been an increase in items in long supply.
As the Navy has been involved in extensive "show the flag"
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evolutions during this time period, one must wonder what both
the public and official outcry would have been if Navy ships
and/or aircraft could not have completed their missions
because of a lack of proper spare parts. It is the
researcher's opinion that as austerity affects DOD's budgets,
once again SMA will drop, but hopefully not as much as in the
1970's.
D. NEW INVENTORY POLICY
SPCC in June 1987 revised its reordering policy in order
to take advantage of both item demand trends and quantity
price discounts while continuing to operate in a constrained
financial and personnel environment. In order to address
GAO' s opinion that a blanket twelve-month order quantity was
not efficient, this new minimum EOQ policy was established
.
Since DOD Instruction 4140.39 [Ref. 50] specifies that no
order quantity will be less than 3-months demand or more than
3-years demand, SPCC has established the following as its
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The intention of this policy is to minimize the
procurement of items which are trending either way or are
very expensive. The researcher believes that this policy
will assist SPCC in reducing its DILS and actual long supply
dollars by not tying up large dollar amounts for items which
might not be useful in the future.
E. POTENTIAL SYSTEMS
SPCC is currently reviewing other methods by which it can
improve its ordering process. The three which will briefly
be discussed in this section are: (1) Project Q-Star, (2)




For individuals not familiar with inventory
management terminology, the symbol Q* is given to that
quantity of items which is optimum to order. The SPCC
project named Q-Star was designed to create an evaluation
procedure for bids where quantity discounts and varying
amounts of lead time apply. The Air Force has had a similar
program since the late 1970' s and apparently has had no major
problems with industries' acceptance of it. [Ref. 55]
The Logistics Management Institute (LMI), issued a
report [Ref. 18] on PCLT which was quite critical of the poor
communication between the inventory managers and the
procurement managers . LMI reported that DOD provided few
incentives to reduce PCLT and had made no effort to integrate
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the objectives of both inventory and procurement management.
Another fault reported was that the "cost" of the item was in
fact procurement dollar oriented only, with no analysis being
done to determine "the total cost" (procurement and ordering
costs as well as PCLT involved) of the item. LMI also
recommended that DOD develop trade-off models to compare PCLT
with price in order to determine the best buy. [Ref. 18]
Q-Star is SPCC s first real effort at developing a
trade-off model to look at price, quantity and PCLT. The
present UICP uses fixed price and PCLT values when computing
EOQ. This results in the total variable costs (TVCs) only
being minimized for that specific instance. Project Q-Star
hopes to determine the "optimal order size" by taking
different inputs from both PCLT and price. The items which
hold a high potential for Q-Star usage are those consumable
items which have a high, strong and steady demand history.
It has been estimated that approximately 2,000 items at SPCC
are potential candidates [Ref. 55].
Once an item has been determined to be a potential
candidate, a bid range is set so as to be included in the
request for proposal. This bid range is for one to twelve
quarters of demand plus the current material requirement.
From this stage, the proposals received are reviewed to
determine the price, quantity and lead time combination that
represents the least total relevant cost to the Navy. In
this case total relevant costs consist of the sum of: (1)
102
annual total variable costs, (2) investment opportunity
costs, and (3) costs of the current material requirement.
[Ref. 55]
Since July 1986 only six or seven contracts have been
awarded using the Q-Star technique. After discussions with
its creator, John Boyarski, the researcher was left with the
feeling that this is a project which has been given
insufficient emphasis at SPCC. The major stumbling block
appears to be the unfamiliarity and distrust of procurement
personnel with anything new when PURS is based upon the tried
and true methods of old. If this system was more fully used,
long supply problems might be substantially reduced. Better
usage of funds and less likelihood of a need to terminate a
procurement contract are probable results of fully
implementing this project.
2. BIDNET
SPCC, through its contracting department, is
currently conducting a test to determine the benefit of
distributing solicitations through commercial networks, in
this case through BIDNET. BIDNET is a company of The Dun &
Bradstreet Corporation. This test is being conducted using
an established base of several thousand companies. When
these companies sign up with BIDNET for the SPCC/BIDNET
Express Distribution Network, they indicate what type of
products they are interested in bidding on. As the test is
presently being conducted, a "Bid Alert" is electronically
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transmitted to the company. The "Bid Alert" notifies the
company of a potential contract they might be interested in
bidding on. If the company desires the entire Request for
Quotation, they can have BIDNET send them the package within
48 hours for a fixed fee, or they can request by letter that
SPCC send them a package. Either way, SPCC's cost to
advertise is reduced significantly. This in turn lowers the
administrative order cost term of the EOQ model, making the
order quantity (Q) smaller and thereby reducing the risk of
the item becoming long supply. The next logical step is to
make fuller usage of electronic bulletin boards to obtain
both increased competition for normal procurements as well as
the potential for actually competing emergent requirements
which are normally procured on a sole source basis. [Ref.
56]
3 „ Improved Manufacturing Flexibility
The Navy has just recently brought on-line its latest
effort towards improving both equipment down-time and parts
availability. This effort is called Rapid Acquisition of
Manufactured Parts (RAMP). This program' s objective is to
"reduce the Navy's spare parts supply and procurement
problems by fabricating parts in small quantities, on short
notice and at a reasonable cost." [Ref 57 :p. 6] RAMP
depends upon significantly reducing PCLT so that rather than
stocking large quantities of items to provide for safety
stock, lead time demand stock and variability of demand, an
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attempt is made to use "just in time" inventory management.
RAMP also involves the electronic transfer of digitized data,
just as BIDNET electronically transfers requirements. A more
detailed look at RAMP may be gained through the reading of
Darby's thesis on this subject [Ref. 57].
F . SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed what NAVSUP and SPCC have done
in an attempt to stem the rising number of items in long
supply. The chapter also discussed the actions the Navy is
currently taking to improve its inventory management system
so that items need not be ordered several years in advance of
the requirement and in inflated quantities. Chapter VII
describes .the recommended decision making mechanism
concerning the actions which should be taken when secondary




After the problems identified in Chapter VI with what
NAVSUP and SPCC have done in an attempt to stem the rising
number of items in long supply, it is only reasonable to
expect an alternative to be offered. This chapter will
present the researcher's recommended decision-making model




The model that follows is described via flow charts and
narrative. The following section contains a step-by-step
narrative description of how the model can be used. The
second section contains the flow charts that comprise the
model
.
This model is presently configured solely for consumable
items at SPCC (not ASO) . The model also uses the $10,000
constraint from the SPCC termination criteria of Chapter VI
due to its logical derivation. Two items from the FAR play a
major role in this model. They are: (1) FAR 49.101(c) where
contracts with excess material valued at less than $2,000 are
not recommended for termination, and (2) FAR 49.101(e) which,
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when terminating, gives a preference to small business over
large business in continuing contracts.
The test for an item' s demand trend in the model is the
same as used in the current UICP . The test first computes a
trend value, t, through the following equation:
t = 2 x (sum of last two observations)/ (sum of last four
observations)
At SPCC, if t > 1.10 and (last observation) > (old average
forecast) , then an upward demand trend is indicated. If, on
the other hand, t < 0.90 and (last observation) < (old
average forecast), a downward demand trend is indicated.
Otherwise, no trend is considered to be present. These
figures indicate that SPCC is quite sensitive to demand
variation. ASO, due to having a higher average unit cost,
does not allow for an upward trend unless t > 1.50 and a
downward trend if t < 0.99. Thus ASO is quick to catch a
downward trend and so saves procurement dollars. In addition
ASO is slow to detect upward trends, again saving procurement
dollars. [Ref. 24:pp. 3-A-29, 3-A-30]
NOTE: Throughout the following steps it is important to
realize that when the phrase "go to step 15" appears, the
quantity in question is to be terminated. Starting with step




Item is identified as being in excess. There are
three ways in which this can be determined:
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1. SDR--Based on Net Asset Position being positive:
[Ref. 13:Encl. 1 p.l]
Assets Requirements
OH (On-hand) Reorder level (Lead Time
Demand + Safety Level)
Due on Purchase Request AWR (Acquisition War




Requ i r ement s ( PP Rs )
within PCLT
Total Assets Total Requirements
2. Stratification-—Based upon determination of the
retention limit. This is based upon a summation of the
following categories: [Ref. 24 :p. 3-55]









Approved force retention quantity
If assets (on-hand and due-in) exceed this retention
limit, they are potential excess quantities.
3. Manual—information is received by the IM that would
drastically change an item' s status. Examples might be
equipment overhauls , weapon system termination, program
stretchout, item migration to other branches of the
services or DLA, major operational tempo decrease due
to funding constraints, or even being obsolete due to
new technology.
Ensure files (both the Master Data File, MDF, and the
Due-in/Due-out File) are updated as necessary before
proceeding further. The IM must input her knowledge of the
item which is not reflected in these files to ensure an
accurate "picture" of the item's status is obtained.
Potential inputs include: placing the material in the correct
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material condition code, looking at past CSSR' s to see if
PPR' s were accidentally "browsed" out, and checking to ensure
all planned outfittings are included. If the item is still




Are there any outstanding procurement actions (either
purchase requests or contracts for the remainder of this
model)
?
— if no, STOP, as there are no outstanding
contracts
.
— if yes, go to step 3.
Step 3
Compute the dollar value of the excess material:
Quantity in excess x replacement price. Then go to step 4.
Step 4
Is the excess the result of a Life-of-Type (LOT) buy?
LOT buy is a one time procurement of sufficient quantity to
meet all demands through the items useful life. The
preferred situation for LOT buys would be that a "flag" would
be turned on for the item in the Master Data File (MDF) so
that SDR would not do an excess computation on the item.
But, unless this flag is applied 100% of the time, and only
to the correct items, this added step in logic might prevent
accidentally terminating a LOT buy.
— if no, go to step 4a.
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-- if yes, STOP, continue procurement actions.
Step 4a
Are applicable weapon systems in use by the U.S. military
services (active or reserve) or by foreign governments?
-- if no, go to step 15.
-- if yes, go to step 5.
Step 5
Is the item itself obsolete? The definition of obsolete
used in this model is similar to that of functional
obsolescence in Black' s Law Dictionary [Ref. 58].
obsolete—the state in which an item needs
replacement because its parent structure or equipment
has become inefficient or out-moded because of
improvements developed since its original
construction or production [Ref. 58 :p. 606] . An item
can be obsolete to the Active Navy, Reserve Navy,
and/or foreign governments having this weapon system.
— if no, go to step 6.
-- if yes, go to step 100.
Step 6
Was the procurement action under examination for
potential termination based upon a defective, faulty or
imperfect specification rendering the item unusable for its
original purpose? The IM will obtain this information by one
or both of the following methods. First, either the end user
(in the case of filling backorders) or the receiving
personnel at a stock point (in normal situations) might
detect and report a problem with the items form, fit, or
function. The second method is that of communications
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received from the technical personnel at either the ICP, the
appropriate Systems Headquarters, or even from the contractor
himself concerning problems or potential problems with the
specification
.
— if no, go to step 7.
— if yes, go to step 15.
Step 7
Has there been a change since the last SDR in the
applicable engineering support method to be used for this
item? (From repairable to consumable, from field level
repair to depot repair, etc.)
— if no, go to step 8.
— if yes, go to step 12.
Step 8
Has there been a change in funded PPRs since the last
SDR?
— if no, go to step 9.
— if yes, go to step 20.
Step 9
Was this item procured under a SAIP (Spares Acquisition
Integrated with Production) program?
-- if no, go to step 10.
-- if yes, go to step 20.
Step 10
Is the dollar value of the excess > $2,000? This value
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is used due to FAR 49.101(c) which recommends that contracts
less than $2,000 should normally not be terminated.
— if no, STOP. Continue procurement actions
— if yes, go to step 50.
Step 12
Will the applicable Hardware Systems Command buy the item
from the Navy Stock Fund?
if no, go to step 15.
-- if yes, STOP. Continue procurement action.
Step 15
Cancel all purchase requests, then go to step 16.
Step 16
Any open contracts?
— if no, STOP.
-- if yes, go to step 17.
Step 17
Is a no cost settlement acceptable to the applicable
contractor?
-- if no, go to step 18.
-- if yes, issue no cost settlement, then STOP.
Step 18
Can the contract be terminated for default?
-- if no, issue termination for convenience, then
STOP.
-- if yes, issue termination for default, then STOP.
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Step 20
Was the weapon system the item was used in deleted,
retired or otherwise removed from the Navy's and other
services' inventories?
-- if no, go to step 25.
— if yes, go to step 21.
Step 21
Are there any other weapon system applications for this
item?
— if no, go to step 15.
— if yes, go to step 28.
Step 25
Did the item' s program suffer a major delay?
— if no, go to step 30.
— if yes, go to step 26.
Step 26
Was the program slippage longer than the items PCLT?
— if no, go to step 28.
— if yes, go to step 27.
Step 27
Are proposed contractor termination fees greater than 50%
of contract value?
-- if no, go to step 15.
— if yes, go to step 28.
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Step 28
Is the item's IMEC (Item Mission Essentiality Code) 3 or
4?
if no, go to step 32.
— if yes, go to step 200.
Step 30
Was the item's applicable program reduced?
-- if no, go to step 28.
— if yes, go to step 31.
Step 31
Are items in excess of the new total requirement plus
expected demand during PCLT?
if no, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
— if yes, go to step 28.
Step 32
Is the dollar value of the excess > $2,000?
— if no, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
-- if yes, go to step 55.
Step 50
Is the item's IMEC 3 or 4?
if no, go to step 55.
— if yes, go to step 200.
Step 55
Is the item's demand trending upward?
if no, go to step 56.
if yes, go to step 250.
114
Step 56
Is the dollar value of the excess being procured >
$2, 000?
— if no, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
— if yes, go to step 57.
Step 57
Are there any outstanding purchase requests?
— if no, go to step 60.
— if yes, go to step 58.
Step 58
Terminate purchase requests until:
— no excess remains, STOP.
— all purchase requests terminated, go to step 60.
Step 60
Is the dollar value of the excess < $10,000?
— if no, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
— if yes, go to step 61.
Step 61
Initiate partial or complete terminations of contracts
until all excess is eliminated or until all contracts have
been terminated. Then STOP.
Step 100
Is there a commercial alternative which would fulfill
form, fit and function of obsolete item?
— if no, go to step 301
.
-- if yes, go to step 101.
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Step 101
Compute new requirements using the commercial
alternative's PCLT. Compare the on-order quantity to the new
requirement
.
— on-order > new requirement, go to step 15. Note:
if new requirements are greater than zero, the IM
must order new items
.
— on-order < new requirement, STOP. Note: it is
highly unlikely that an item will end up here. This
is because SDR "said" item was in a long supply
status, yet now the on-order quantity is less than
the new requirement. The IM needs to find out why
this is so. The three choices for action to be
taken, depending upon that the IM determines, are:
(1) terminate the contract, (2) consolidate stock to




Is the item's demand trending upward?
— if no, go to step 201.
— if yes, go to step 250.
Step 201
Is the item' s demand trending downward?
— if no, go to step 210.
— if yes, go to step 202.
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Step 202
Terminate purchase requests until:
— no excess remains, STOP.
— all purchase requests are terminated, go to step
203.
Step 203
Is the item's unit price > $2,000?
— if no, go to step 204.
-- if yes, go to step 205.
Step 204
Terminate all contracts except for one item from the
contract with earliest required delivery date (RDD) , favor
small business over large business for continuing, then STOP.
Step 205
Partially or completely terminate contracts until the
excess is < $2,000. Favor small over large business. Cancel
contracts with farthest FDD's first.
Step 210
Can the item be used as Government Furnished Material on
parent equipment contracts presently outstanding or nearing
award?
— if no, go to step 211.
-- if yes, go to step 225.
Step 211
Is the dollar value of the excess < $10,000?
— if no, go to step 212.
117
-- if yes, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
Step 212
Are any purchase requests for the item outstanding?
— if no, go to step 214.
— if yes, go to step 213.
Step 213
Terminate purchase requests until:
-- no excess remains, STOP.
— all purchase requests terminated, go to step 214.
Step 214
Is the dollar value of the remaining excess < $50,000?
— if no, go to step 215.




Partially or completely terminate contracts until all
excess is eliminated or until all contracts have been
terminated, then STOP. Favor small over large business.
Cancel contracts with farthest RDD f s first.
Step 225
Issue modification to present equipment contract (s) to
reflect item being provided as Government Furnished Material
vice Contractor Furnished Material, then:
— no excess remains, STOP. Continue procurement
actions
-- all excess items remaining, go to step 211.
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Step 250
Does the item have a shelf life or is it hazardous
material?
— if no, go to step 260.
— if yes, go to step 251.
Step 251
Is the item hazardous material?
— if no, go to step 252.
— if yes, go to step 326.
Step 252
Check with technical personnel and/or review the last
CSSR received to ascertain probable cause for change in
demand:
— if aberration, go to step 253.
— if not an aberration, go to step 254.
Step 253
Align computed requirements to RDD's of outstanding
procurement actions, then go to step 360.
Step 254
Update the Quarterly Systems Demand Forecast (UICP
application B074) to reflect the new demand and PPR'
s
requiring adjustments. Data elements requiring updates might
include new lead time values, known upcoming ship
deployments, change in IMEC, or change in unit price. Then
go to step 255.
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Step 255
Recompute assets to requirements. Is the item still in a
long supply situation?
-- if no, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
-- if yes, go to step 256.
Step 256
Align newly computed requirements to RDD's of outstanding
procurement actions, then go to step 257.
Step 257
Identify items to requirement, by date. Partially or
completely cancel purchase requests or terminate contracts
until no excess remains, then STOP.
Step 260
Check with technical personnel and/or review the last
CSSR received to ascertain probable cause for change in
demand
.
— if aberration, go to step 56.
— if not an aberration, go to step 261.
Step 261
Update the Quarterly Systems Demand Forecast (UICP
application B074) to reflect the new demand and PPR'
s
requiring adjustments. Data elements requiring updates might
include new lead time values, known upcoming ship
deployments, change in IMEC, or change in unit price. Then
go to step 2 62.
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Step 2 62
Recompute assets to requirements. Is the item still in a
long supply status?
-- if no, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
-- if yes, go to step 56.
Step 301
Does the item have a shelf life or is it hazardous
material?
— if no, go to step 305.
-- if yes, go to step 302.
Step 302
Is the item hazardous material?
— if no, go to step 303.
-- if yes, go to step 325.
Step 303
Is the item's IMEC 3 or 4?
™ if no, go to step 350.
— if yes, go to step 300.
Step 305
Is the dollar value of the excess > $2,000?
-- if no, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
— if yes, go to step 306.
Step 306
Is the item's IMEC 3 or 4?
— if no, go to step 307.
-- if yes, go to step 200.
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Step 307
Terminate purchase requests until excess is gone or until
all purchase requests are terminated. No excess?
-- if no, go to step 308.
-- if yes, STOP.
Step 308
Is the unit price > $2,000?
— if no, go to step 309.
-- if yes, go to step 310.
Step 309
Terminate contracts with FDD's farthest from present date
until excess is > $2,000, then STOP.
Step 310
Terminate all contracts with the exception of 1 unit or
unit pack. The item saved should be from the contract with
the closest, firm RDD . Then STOP.
Step 325
Is the item's IMEC 3 or 4?
— if no, go to step 340.
— if yes, go to step 326.
Step 326
Can the average customer wait time standard be met by one
stock point on each coast?
— if no, go to step 335.
— if yes, go to step 327.
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Step 327
Are existing hazardous material storage areas available
in adequate size for stocking at a single stock point on each
coast?
— if no, go to step 335.
— if yes, go to step 328.
Step 328
Consolidate inventory at one activity per coast to
maximize bin closings at NSC's. Then go to step 329.
Step 329
Is the dollar value of the excess < $10,000?
— if no, go to step 331.
-- if yes, go to step 330.
Step 330
STOP. Continue all procurement actions. Modify




Are there any purchase requests outstanding?
— if no, go to step 333.
— if yes, go to step 332.
Step 332
Terminate purchase requests until the excess is gone or
until all purchase requests are terminated. Any excess?
— if no, STOP.
-- if yes, go to step 333.
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Step 333
Is the dollar value of the excess < $50,000?
— if no, go to step 215.
— if yes, go to step 330.
Step 335
Do all stock points have adequate and proper storage
facilities for the quantity in procurement which will be
stored there?
-- if no, go to step 336.
— if yes, go to step 211.
Step 336
Cancel the quantity in excess of proper storage capacity
for each stock point. Cancel purchase requests first, then
contracts most recently awarded until proper storage capacity
constraints are met. Then STOP. Continue the procurement
actions not cancelled or terminated.
Step 340
Is dollar value of excess > $2,000?
— if no, go to step 341.
— if yes, go to step 342.
Step 341
Are adequate and proper storage facilities available at
all stock points?
— if no, go to step 336.
-- if yes, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
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Step 342
Cancel purchase requests until excess is gone or until
all purchase requests cancelled. Any excess?
— if no, STOP.
— if yes, go to step 16.
Step 350
Compare the item's shelf life with RDD's of outstanding
procurement actions
.
-- if foreign government requirements only, go to
step 351.
-- all others, go to step 355.
Step 351
Compute the estimated cost of disposal and holding the
item. Go to step 352.
Step 352
Compute the estimated proceeds of future sales to foreign
governments. Go to step 353.
Step 353
Compare the costs of disposal and holding to the proceeds
of sale.
— if result positive, go to step 15.




Align computed requirements to RDD's of outstanding
procurement actions, then go to step 360.
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Step 360
Cancel purchase requests for items which, when compared
to RDDs, are anticipated to exceed their shelf life prior to
projected requirements, then go to step 361.
Step 361
Is the dollar value of the excess > $2,000?
— if no, STOP. Continue remaining procurement
actions
.
-- if yes, go to step 362.
Step 362
Protect the minimum of: demand during shelf life, or lead
time (PCLT) demand. Any excess?
— if no, STOP.
— if yes, go to step 15.
Figure 7-1 is the actual flow chart which graphically
illustrates how the model functions. The wording in the flow
chart itself is very limited, thus if the reader has
questions, referring back to the above listed steps should
provide the proper answers
.
C. COMPARISON OF LOGIC
In this section, a comparison is made between the
researcher's and SPCC's models. SPCC's procedures are
presented in Figure 7-2
.
1 . Current Termination Procedures
The following steps correspond to SPCC s current












































































































Figure 7- le. Decision Model
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Figure 7-2. SPCC Termination Procedures Model
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The full SPCC termination process is described in Appendix C
of this thesis.
a. Step 1. Validate Data Element Numbers. File (MDF and
Due-in/Due-out files) update required?
-- if no, go to step 2.
— if yes, go to step 3.
b. Step 2. Compute the dollar value of the excess: Excess
x Replacement Price. Then go to step 4.
c. Step 3. Recompute excess by manual simulation of SDR:
Excess = Total Assets - Total Requirements-
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) - PPRs due within
the EOQ Horizon. Then go to step 2.
d. Step 4. Is the dollar value of the excess < $10,000?
-- if no, go to step 5.
— if yes, STOP. Continue procurement actions.
e. Step 5 . Are there any outstanding purchase requests?
— if no, go to step 8.
— if yes, go to step 6.
f. Step 6. Terminate purchase requests until no excess
remains or all purchase requests have been
terminated. Then go to step 7.
g. Step 7. Is there any excess?
— if no, STOP.
— if yes, go to step 8.
g. Step 8. Is the dollar value of the remaining excess
$50,000?
-- if no, go to step 9.
-- if yes, STOP. Continue remaining
procurement actions.
h. Step 9. Terminate, partially or completely, contracts
until all excess is gone or until all contracts
are terminated. Terminate most recently
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awarded contracts first. Favor continuing
contracts with small business over large
business
.
2 . Differences between models
The current SPCC model is very short, and in most
instances would probably do its task quite well. An
important point, however is that exceptions to this model are
never clearly written out. The researcher's model forces the
IM to logically think about the reasons the item went into a
long supply status. Another fault of the SPCC model is that
no differentiation between IMEC codes is considered, yet
items crucial to a weapon system' s proper functioning are
competing for funding with those items that are much less
crucial. The researcher's model splits out the IMEC 3 and 4
items, as well as those items with limited shelf life or
which are hazardous materials.
SPCC uses two values ($10,000 and $50,000) for
decision values regarding termination in its model. Through
the use of the FAR mandated $2,000 minimum level, a more
thorough examination of potential termination candidates than
with SPCC's $10,000 value will be achieved. Of course, if
future usage of the researcher's model shows adverse affects,
such as a disproportionate amount of procurement manpower
being spent on this process, this value could be raised. If
raised, the values should be justified in writing in order to
explain these changes to future auditors. The $50,000 value
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that SPCC uses appears to have been arbitrarily set, thus
asking for criticism in future audits.
The researcher's model also presents a logic chart
for the buyer to ensure the use of the types of terminations
preferred by the FAR and case law: (1) no cost settlement,
(2) termination for default, and (3) termination for
convenience
.
Whether an item is trending upward or downward is
also considered in the researcher's model but not in SPCC's.
Other applications and potential future users are also
required to be considered in the researcher's model.
D. SUMMARY
By asking the hard questions up front and requiring the
IM to logically think through all the possible alternatives
about how the item went into a long supply status, better
solutions for future procurements should be obtained.
"Better" in this case means more dollars freed up, but not at
a cost of readiness or SMA. Transferring this model into an
expert system resident within the UICP would be the ideal
methodology for the future. This would allow the program to
achieve more consistency in future termination decisions, a
definite step forward for the U.S. Navy.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
In addition to the conclusions and recommendations,
answers to the research questions posed in Chapter I are
provided in this Chapter. The Chapter concludes with the




Conclusion #1: U.S. Navy secondary items going into
a long supply condition is not a recent phenomenon.
If secondary items going into a long supply condition
had only occurred in the past few years, different
recommendations and models would have required development.
As stated in Chapter II, the GAO has been reporting on the
long supply issue since the 1950' s. This confirms the fact
that larger defense budgets do not per se cause more
secondary items to enter long supply status
.
2 Conclusion #2: The term "long supply" does not have
a universal definition.
Until all parties involved agree on a definition for
long supply, the problem of secondary items in long supply
will continue. During the research for this thesis, many
examples were found of disagreements as to the meaning of
140




Conclusion #3: The proposed NAVSUP termination model
is not as comprehensive as is required to properly
identify which procurement action (s) should be
terminated once a secondary item is determined to be
in a long supply status
.
In order for a model to accurately portray reality,
and therefore be of value, the various decision processes
actually used must be duplicated. As was discussed in
Chapters V and VI, attempting to quantify a process which is
comprised of many subjective inputs shows an inherent
weakness in the NAVSUP model. The decision-making model of
Chapter VII is the researcher's effort at leaving subjective
values subjective, quantifying what can be quantified while
simultaneously achieving a reasonable decision concerning the
action to be taken on procurements of secondary items in long
supply
.
4 Conclusion #4: The current SPCC termination criteria
does not address all areas which are crucial to
properly decide which contract actions should be
terminated and which should be completed.
SPCC's termination criteria are provided as Appendi::
C and have been discussed in Chapters VI and VII. As was
pointed out in Chapter VII, when contrasted with the
researcher's model, SPCC currently does not do as thorough a
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review of how the item went into a long supply condition
prior to deciding what action is to be taken.
5 . Conclusion #5: If the draft POD Instruction
concerning termination of secondary items is
implemented, SPCC should be able to quickly comply
with DOD f s requirements.
Due to the recent increase in both GAO and Department
of Defense Inspector General audits concerning secondary
items in long supply status, the researcher believes that
political pressure will be applied to the Secretary of
Defense to make all branches of the Services conform to a
single policy. Appendix B is the version of the Draft DOD
Instruction which is currently in the hands of the Services
for their comments. Chapters II, VI and VII discussed
current SPCC procedures which basically comply with the draft
instruction, with the exception of not formally designating a
"terminations coordinator." Unless further changes are made
to this Instruction prior to issuance, SPCC can easily modify




1 . Recommendation #1 : The term "long supply" should
have one standard definition.
Unless agreement is reached as to exactly what "long
supply" means, no solution will satisfy everyone concerned.
The researcher believes that the DOD Instruction on
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termination of secondary items in long supply status would be
the ideal medium by which to implement this recommendation.
The researcher proposes the following definition: " long
supply : when assets of an item exceed all known requirements
during its procurement lead time." Thus as lead time is
decreased, fewer items will be allowed to be protected from
termination by the IM, as should be the case. In this
definition, assets and requirements are those that are listed
in Chapter II for the supply demand review.
2
.
Recommendation #2: The researcher' s decision model
should be used by SPCC's Item Managers (IMs) when
secondary items are determined to be in a long supply
status
.
The decision-making model described in Chapter VII
requires IMs to follow a very structured path to determine
what the appropriate action should be. By following the
model to its recommendation, the maximum dollars should be
recouped while maintaining item essentiality by treating IMEC
3 and 4 items differently.
3 Recommendation #3: During Resystemization at SPCC,
the researcher's decision model should be programmed
into the Uniform Inventory Control Program (UICP) as
an on-line expert system.
By having the model in the UICP, the IM would not
have to make any special effort to use the model . Data could
be obtained directly from the UICP and thereby reduce both
143
the number and volume of items that the IM would have to
manually input. By using an expert system, consistency and
accuracy in determining the proper action to be taken would
increase. This increase in consistency and accuracy
throughout the ICP would reduce the potential for future
auditor's to comment that arbitrary decisions were being
made
.
4 . Recommendation #4: Increased accountability and
traceability must be implemented by SPCC in order to
reestablish both buyer and IM confidence in the
termination process.
Although both buyers and IMs at SPCC are quite aware
of the increased emphasis given to items in a long supply
status, a mistrust of the current system exists. Today the
IMs complete an SDR action form, submit it, and assume the
matter is finished. As was described in Chapter II, four to
six weeks passes between the time the IM submits the form and
the time a DT (Due-in Termination) card is given to the
appropriate buyer. The form itself is kept by the personnel
in key-punching and the IM never sees the DT card. This
failure to provide the actual source document raises doubts;
did the personnel in key-punch accurately create a DT card
for what (contract (s) , or purchase request (s) ) the IM wanted
cancelled, and what if changes have occurred to the item' s
situation in the four to six week processing time period? By
attaching the signed SDR action form physically to the DT
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card, the buyer will know for sure that what is being
requested actually is what the IM desires cancelled. The
only exception to this would be drastic changes in an items
demand during the four to six weeks required to process the
SDR action form. In this case, the IM would need to get her
supervisors assistance in contacting the appropriate team
leader in the contract administration division in order to
change the SDR action form. This method should only be
allowed in extreme cases in order to allow the system to
provide an accurate audit trail. The DT Cancellation form
created by SPCC Code 025 (see Appendix D) , when used in
conjunction with the signed SDR action form with DT card
attached, should provide the kind of accountability and
traceability which is needed.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . Subsidiary question #1
:
How are items determined to
be in excess of requirements by Navy Ships Parts
Control Center (SPCC)?
The three methods by which an item can be determined
to be in excess of requirements are:
a. SDR--comparison of assets to requirements with an
additional buffer stock of four or eight quarters worth
of demand. The excess is that quantity of assets which
exceed the requirements and the buffer stock.
b. Stratification— items reported on line B21 of the
report are potential excess. If not actually on-hand,
items in lines B16 through B21 of the report are DILS
(due-in Long Supply) as they are the unfunded assets
and therefore can be considered to be in excess. and;
c. by manual input. This occurs when the IM obtains new
information about an item which either cannot be
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reflected in the SDR and stratification figures or will
not show up in these figures for a long time.
2. Subsidiary question #2: What is the decision-making
process leading to a termination for the convenience
of the Government of secondary item contracts?
SPCC currently uses the termination criteria listed
in Appendix C. This method requires the dollar value of
excess items to be over $10,000 to cancel purchase requests
and over $50,000 to terminate contracts.
3. Subsidiary question #3: What is the potential impact
of the draft DOD Instruction regarding secondary
items no longer needed on the Navy's wholesale
inventory operating procedures?
There will be very little impact on SPCC. A
terminations coordinator will have to be formally assigned
and current instructions and procedures changed to reflect
this person's responsibility with regard to contract
terminations
„
4. Subsidiary question #4: What is the requirements
process and how can it lead to the placement of
contracts for items in excess of requirements?
The Navy UICP uses a modified EOQ formula to
determine the optimal quantity to order in its continuous
review inventory system. In Chapter II, eight reasons for
contracts being placed when items are actually in excess of
requirements were given. The prime factor was a breakdown in
communications occurring so that the necessary information
did not get to the appropriate IM in time to prevent an order
from being placed.
5. Subsidiary question #5: What are the principal
elements of a model which produces an optimum
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decision regarding contract termination for items in
excess of requirements?





d. item essentiality; and,
e. the time until reprocurement must occur.
6
.
The primary question: Should the U.S. Navy terminate
secondary item contracts considered to be in excess
of current requirements?
This question must be answered with a "that depends .
"
The model developed in Chapter VII forces the IM and buyer to
think through each individual situation in order to decide
what the correct business decision should be.
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1
.
Further research should be done to compare actual
items in a long supply status which were either
terminated or not to see how the model would work in
actual practice.
2. Further research should be conducted in implementing
an expert system dealing with contract terminations,
either as part of the UICP or on a stand-alone
personal computer.
3 Further research should be done to adapt the
researcher's decision model to repairable items.
4 Further research should be aimed at conducting
sensitivity analysis of the various dollar values
used in the researcher's model in order to optimize
its usefulness. Measures of effectiveness might
include the models effect on SMA, the dollars saved
by following the model, and the actual reduction in






Administrative Lead Time (ALT) . The length of time from the
generation of a procurement action until a contract is
awarded. [Ref. 2 4 :p. A-l]
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages
(DMSMS)
. The loss or impending loss of manufacturers of
items or supplies of items or raw material. DMSMS is caused
when manufacturers of items or raw material suppliers
discontinue production. Some of the reasons are as follows:
a. Rapid change in item or material technology;
b. Uneconomical production requirements;
c. Foreign source competition;
d. Federal environmental and safety requirements; or
e. Limited availability of items and raw material used in
the manufacturing process.
DMSMS situations tend to have a pervasive effect that not
only precludes repair of material but also precludes
procurement of additional systems, equipment, spare
assemblies, and subassemblies that depend on the DMSMS items
and raw material for their manufacture. [Ref. 16:Encl. 2 p.
2-1]
Excess on-order spare parts . Those quantities that exceed a
4-year supply. [Ref. 14 :p. 1]
Implied Shortage Cost . The assumed cost of a shortage based
upon other management decisions relative to the number of
days to be forecast for delay in the availability of material
or the funds available for inventory levels. [Ref. 50: End.
1 P- 1]
Life-of-type (LOT) buy . A one-time procurement, when all
cost-effective and prudent alternatives have been exhausted,
for the total future requirement of an item no longer to be
produced. The procurement quantity shall be based upon
demand or engineering estimates of mortality sufficient to
support the applicable equipment until phased out. [Ref.
16:Encl. 2 p. 2-2]
Long supply . Assets of an item in excess of all known or
expected requirements during some time period, usually
thought of as in excess of the Retention Limit. [Ref. 24 :p.
A-9] GAO uses two or more years of supply beyond current
needs. [Ref. 12 :p. 6] The position of having an excess
quantity on-hand of an item. May require disposal action.
[Ref. 25:p. B-7]
149
Obsolescence . The process by which an item becomes no longer
technically useful. [Ref. 24:p. A-13]
Planned Program Requirements (PPRs) . An anticipated
requirement for material that cannot be adequately forecasted
by UICP using past demand observations. These future
requirements are known sufficiently ahead of the need for the
material that assets can be obtained to meet the demand.
Theoretically, PPRs for scheduled projects or programs are
requested as nonrecurring demand by the customers. [Ref.
24:p. A-14]
Principal Items . End items and replacement assemblies whose
importance requires centralized individual item management
throughout the supply system, that is, at the depot level,
the base level, and the using unit level. These specifically
include the items for which, in the judgement of the DOD
Component, there is a need for central inventory control,
including: computation of requirements, procurement,
direction of distribution, and knowledge and control of all
assets owned by the DOD Component. Aircraft, ships, and
tanks are examples of principal items. [Ref. 8: End. 1 p. 1]
Procurement Lead Time (PCLT) . The length of time from the
generation of a procurement action until the initial receipt
of material from contract. The sum of PLT + ALT. [Ref.
24:p. A-14]
Production Lead Time (PLT) . The length of time from
procurement contract award until the initial receipt of
material from contract. [Ref. 24 :p. A-15]
Retention Limit . The maximum quantity of an item that is
authorized to be retained within the wholesale supply system
to meet future requirements. [Ref. 24 :p. A-17]
Safety Level . The quantity of material which is required to
be on hand to permit continued operation in the event of
minor interruption of normal replenishment or unpredictable
fluctuation in demand. [Ref. 50:Encl. 1 p. 2]
Secondary Items . End items, consumables, and repairable
items other than principal items. [Ref. 8:Encl. 1 p. 1]
Total Variable Cost (TVC) . The sum of the variable cost to
order, variable cost to hold and implied shortage cost.
Procurement cycles and safety levels are determined through
minimization of these costs for any given group of items in
an inventory. [Ref. 50:Encl. 1 pp. 1,2]
Uniform Inventory Control Program (UICP) . A series of
computer files and programs used by Navy Inventory Control
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Points (ICPs) to manage wholesale supply system inventories.
[Ref. 24:p. A-20]
Variable Cost to Hold . Those costs associated with the cost
of capital, inventory losses, obsolescence, storage, and
other variable costs of maintaining an inventory. Costs are
considered "fixed" if they would remain constant should 50%
of the workload be eliminated. [Ref. 50:Encl. 1 p. 1]
Variable Cost to Order . Those costs associated with the
determination of requirements, processing of a purchase
request, and subsequent contract actions through receipt of
the order into the ICP system that will vary significantly in
relation to the number of orders processed. Costs are
considered "fixed" if they would remain constant should 50%
of the workload be eliminated. [Ref. 50: End. 1 p. 1]
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APPENDIX B
DRAFT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION
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SUBJECT: Termination of Contracts for Secondary Items That
Are No Longer Needed
References: (a) Code of Federal Regulations, Title 48,
"Federal Acquisition Regulations System,
"
Chapter 1, Part 4 9
A. PURPOSE
This Instruction establishes policy concerning the
termination of contracts for secondary items that are no
longer needed.
B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
1. This Instruction applies to the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) , the Military Departments, the Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) , and the Defense Agencies. The
term "DoD Components," as used herein, refers to the Military
Departments and the Defense Agencies.
2. It applies to all procurements of secondary items at
the wholesale level of supply, and provides guidance to
assist in determining whether contract termination is in the
best interest of the Government. Specific regulatory




1. Principal Items . End items and replacement assemblies
whose importance requires centralized individual item
management throughout the supply system, that is, at the
depot level, the base level, and the using unit level. These
specifically include the items for which, in the judgement of
the DoD Components, there is a need for central inventory
control, including: computation of requirements, procurement,
direction of distribution, and knowledge and control of all
assets owned by the DoD Component. Aircraft, ships, and
tanks are examples of principal items.
2. Secondary Items . End items, consumables, and
repairable items other than principal items
.
D. POLICY
1. It is DoD policy that when changes in missions,
programmed objectives, consumption factors, authorizations,
etc., significantly reduce the requirement for secondary
items, consideration shall be given to reducing or
terminating ongoing contracts for those items
.
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2. All wholesale level supply activities shall establish a
terminations coordinator to manage, monitor, and audit
termination actions within the activity. The terminations
coordinator shall maintain appropriate records to ensure




The automated requirements systems of the DoD
Components shall provide for the identification of unneeded
assets. Thresholds shall be established at which items shall
be flagged for consideration for termination. These
thresholds shall be set at reasonable levels that allow the
limited resources of material management and procurement
organizations to be applied to those items yielding the most
significant returns.
2 Every effort shall be made to cancel or reduce orders
for unneeded or excess material prior to contract award. The
reason for this policy is that the most opportune time to
cancel or reduce orders for material that is no longer needed
is before these orders are placed on contract. Relatively
little cost has been incurred, and the Government is not
obligated for future costs. Even if the item may be procured
in the near future, little is lost by cancelling, and costs
for material, transportation and storage are not incurred
prematurely. Also, preaward work such as the development of
technical data, packaging requirements and procurement
sources may be applicable to future buys.
3. Inventory managers shall consider the reliability of
requirements data, the supply position of the item, the
probability of reprocurement, and the economic trade-offs
involved when deciding whether to pursue termination.
Contracts shall not be terminated when there is a high
probability that the material shall be reprocured in the
relative near future.
4. The following categories of contracts offer a potential
for termination:
(a) Material on order prior to contract award.
(b) Items identified as obsolete or presenting a safety
hazard.
(c) Recently awarded contracts and purchase orders.




5. The procuring contracting officer (PCO) , at the request
of the inventory manager, shall get estimated termination
costs, if any, as soon as possible. PCOs are encouraged to
make telephonic contract with the Contract Administrative
Service (CAS) offices and use appropriate CAS documents such
as cost proposal analyses, progress payment evaluations and
delivery records whenever possible.
6. The following actions shall be considered and costed
when determining whether to terminate a contract for unneeded
material
:
a. Terminate the excess assets on contract. Costs
incurred by the contractor as well as the administrative
costs of terminating the assets shall be considered.
b. Allow the contract to be completed and provide the
assets as Government Furnished Material on production
contracts
.
c. Allow the contract to be completed, and use the
assets as requirements arise. Requirements shall include
security assistance requirements. Expenses associated with
this action are storage costs, cost of money and value of
unused assets.
7. If there is some doubt as to whether termination is
reasonable, the PCO and the inventory manager shall jointly




The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and
Logistics) shall provide policy and guidance as necessary
concerning the termination of contracts for secondary items
that are no longer needed.
2 The Heads of DoD Components shall ensure that their
Components are terminating contracts for secondary items that
are no longer needed when it is appropriate to do so, and
that their Components are complying with the policies of this
Instruction
.
G. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Instruction is effective immediately. Forward one
copy of implementing documents to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Production and Logistics) within 120 days.
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APPENDIX C
TERMINATION PROCEDURES AND THRESHOLD CRITERIA
NAVY SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER, MECHANICSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA
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1. TERMINATION PROCEDURES FOR ITEM MANAGERS (IMs)
a. Validate Data Element Numbers (DENs) and initiate files
updates as necessary upon receipt of an Supply Demand Review
(SDR) termination recommendation or initiation of a manual
termination
.
(1) If no files updates are necessary, go to step b.
(2) If files updates are necessary, recompute the Excess
by manual simulation of SDR:
Excess = Total Assets - Total Requirements - Economic Order
Quantity (EOQ) - Planned Program Requirements
(PPRs) due within the EOQ Horizon
b. Compute the Dollar Value of Excess:
Dollar Value of Excess = Excess X Replacement Price (DEN
B055)
c. If the Dollar Value of Excess < $10,000.00, do not
terminate anything.
d. If the Dollar Value of Excess > $10,000.00, terminate
as follows:
(1) If there are no Purchase Requests (PRs)
,
go to step
(2) . If there are PRs, terminate them until no excess
remains or until all PRs have been terminated.
(a) If no excess remains, STOP.
(b) If all PRs have been terminated, go to step (2)
.
(2) If the Dollar Value of Excess < $50,000.00, STOP.
(3) If the Dollar Value of Excess > $50,000.00, initiate
partial or total termination of contracts until all excess is
eliminated or until all contracts have been terminated.
e. Receive information on termination costs from the buyer
and compare it to the Dollar Value of the Excess to make the
final decision on the termination.
NOTE: The IM decision to terminate is subject to review by
management. While the IM must keep in mind the resource
limitations of the buyers and the level of effort required to
terminate a contract, the IM is in possession of the most
complete information about the item to be terminated.
Therefore, final authority for decisions on termination of
both PRs and contracts rests with the IM, not the Buyer.
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2.
SUMMARY OF TERMINATION PROCEDURES FOR ITEM MANAGERS
Excess = Total Assets - Total Requirements - EOQ - PPRs due
within EOQ Horizon
Dollar Value of Excess = Excess X Replacement Price (DEN
B055)
DOLLAR VALUE
OF EXCESS : ACTION :
< $10,000.00 Do not terminate anything.
> $10,000.00 Terminate PRs until no excess remains or until
all PRs have been terminated.
If all PRs have been terminated and the Dollar Value of
Excess is < $50,000.00, STOP.
If the Dollar Value of Excess is > $50,000.00, initiate
partial or total termination of contracts until all
excess is eliminated or until all contracts have been
terminated.
3 EXAMPLES
The following examples are provided to clarify the command
policy on terminations.
a. Example 1 :
Value of Excess Material on Order $ 8,000




Contract A Contract B
SUBCLIN 1 $ 3,000 SUBCLIN 1 $17,000
SUBCLIN 2 11,000 SUBCLIN 2 21,000
SUBCLIN 3 4,000
Total $14,000 Total $42,000
Action to be taken: None. Total Excess is less than
$10,000.00.
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b. Example 2 :
Value of Excess Material on Order $12,000




Contract A Contract B
SUBCLIN 1 $ 3,000 SUBCLIN 1 $17,000
SUBCLIN 2 11,000 SUBCLIN 2 21,000
SUBCLIN 3 4,000
Total $14,000 Total $42,000
Action to be taken: TERMINATE $12,000 in Purchase Requests
using either full or partial termination





Value of Excess Material on Order $47,000
Outstanding Purchase Requests $10,000
$21,000
Outstanding Contracts
Contract A Contract B
SUBCLIN 1 $ 8,000 SUBCLIN 1 $ 4,000
SUBCLIN 2 11,000 SUBCLIN 2 7,000
SUBCLIN 3 8,000
Total $19,000 Total $19,000
Action to be taken: TERMINATE all Purchase Requests. Do NOT
terminate any contracts
.
NOTE: While this action will leave $16,000 of excess on
order, it does not equal $50,000 therefore, no
contract terminations are to be done.
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d. Example 4 :
Value of Excess Material on Order $63,000




Contract A Contract B
SUBCLIN 1 $ 5,000 SUBCLIN 1 $ 9,000
SUBCLIN 2 4,000 SUBCLIN 2 21,000
SUBCLIN 3 20,000
Total $29,000 Total $30,000
Action to be taken: TERMINATE all Purchase Requests. Do NOT
terminate any contracts
.
e . Example 5 :
Value of Excess Material on Order $80,000




Contract A Contract B
SUBCLIN 1 $ 5,000 SUBCLIN 1 $ 9,000
SUBCLIN 2 4,000 SUBCLIN 2 21,000
SUBCLIN 3 20,000
Total $29,000 Total $30,000
Action to be taken: TERMINATE all Purchase Requests.
Terminate $51,000 worth of contracts.
Where possible, IMs should take all
termination action against a single
contract in order to reduce







Changing demand patterns mandate active termination of PRs
and contracts for material no longer required. Control and
minimization of holding costs can only be accomplished by
proactive management of material due-in. However,
administrative costs associated with terminations require
that some criteria be established to ensure terminations are
accomplished in an economic and efficient manner. The
threshold criteria that follow are used to prevent
terminations in those cases where the potential value of the
termination (in terms of price) is insignificant (in terms of
cost) to terminate. The threshold criteria are to be applied
except when terminating obsolete material, material with no
application, material with bad buy specifications or other
extenuating circumstances such as program phase-down. While
total terminations are easier to accomplish, nothing in this
appendix should be interpreted as requiring only total
termination of PRs or contracts; partial termination is
acceptable if it is the best, or only method to eliminate the
excess quantity on order.
a
.
Automated Dollar Value Threshold for Terminations .
Certain low dollar value excesses are not economical to
pursue for termination. Uniform Inventory Control Point
Program (UICP) provide the capability to set a dollar value
threshold for excess due-in material. Items with less than
this dollar amount of excess due-in will not be considered
for termination. This dollar value threshold is established
by the Inventory Requirements Council (IRC) and stored in DEN
V115. At the time this was printed, it was set at $10,000.00
and the examples in this appendix are based on that value.
b. Automated Dollar Value Threshold for PR Terminations .
Once it has been determined that an item has excess due-
in over the threshold value established in DEN V115, PRs will
be examined for possible termination. The SDR program
recommends terminations for PRs by specific document number
when the dollar value of the PR is above a specific
threshold. This threshold, established by the IRC and stored
in DEN V083, will normally be set to $0.00. This ensures
that all PRs are considered for termination prior to
considering any contracts for termination.
c. Automated Dollar Value Threshold for Contract SUBCLIN
Terminations .
If an item remains in an excess status after all PRs have
been terminated, existing contracts will also be considered
for termination. SDR recommends specific contracts by
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document number for termination if the dollar value of any
Subordinate Contract Line Item (SUBCLIN, also called a 6-
digit CLIN), is above a specified threshold. This threshold
is established by the IRC and stored in DEN V084. Due to a
variety of considerations, it is desirable to be able to
examine all contracts for the material in question before
deciding to terminate any contract, either in full or in
part. Therefore, DEN V084 will normally be set to $0.00.
d. Manual Dollar Value Threshold for Contract
Terminations .
As the administrative cost to cancel contracts is
considerably higher than the cost to cancel a PR, this is an
additional threshold and is established by the IRC. This
threshold is not stored by UICP; it is implemented manually
by the IM. This threshold is the total Dollar Value of
Excess material AFTER all PRs have been terminated. This
threshold value will be adjusted by the IRC based on
resources available. At the time this was printed, it was
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A. INTRODUCTION
The following forms are in use by SPCC Code 025:
1. Long Supply Cancellation request message
From: SPCC MECHANICSBURG PA
To : DCASMA
UNCLAS//N04330//
SUBJ: N00104- , ITEMS 0001AA, QTY EA CANCELLATION OF
1. SUBJ KT IS IN LONG SUPPLY AND MATL NO LONGER REQ
.
2. REQ AGO NOTIFY KTR AND REQ CANC WITHOUT COST OR LIABILITY TO
THE GOVT. IF ABLE TO CANC AT NO COST TO THE GOVT, THEN INFORM
KTR TO DISCONTINUE ALL WORK. ADVISE IF NO COST CANC
IS ACCEPTABLE.
3. IF UNABLE TO CANC WITHOUT COST, HAVE KTR CONTINUE PRODN AND
PROVIDE A BREAKDOWN OF ESTIMATED CANC CHARGES IN WRITING AND HAVE
IND SPEC VERIFY COSTS. PROVIDE RESULTS BY
.
4. IF MATL SHPD ADVISE DATE AND MODE.







2. The following form was created to control cancellation







Contract Administrator Code Phone Number
Inventory Manager (IM) Code Phone Number
IM Supervisor Code Phone Number
DCASMA




Value of material to be cancelled:
Cost of Cancellation:
Value recovered as result of DT
Weapon System material is used on
When will SDR produce a new buy?
Is material replenishment or outfitting?
Contractor estimate of costs:
DCASMA Estimate of costs
Reason for Rejection
Team Leader Review Division Chief Review
165
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